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This pamphlet contains all the statements of the Committee of Fifteen submitted to the Faculty of Arts and Sciences and concurrently circulated within the Harvard community. The reports constitute a record of the Committee's work to June 9th under its 3 charges from the Faculty: to investigate the causes of the April crisis; to assume full responsibility for disciplining the students involved in the forcible occupation of University Hall; and to consult with representatives of the other Faculties and student representatives in order to recommend changes in the governance of the University. The first and longest document, "Interim Report on the Causes of the Recent Crisis," is accompanied by 9 memoranda written by Committee members. "Report on Disciplinary Decisions" summarizes the Committee's actions in the 138 cases presented to it in connection with the occupation of University Hall. The text of a letter sent to 102 students placed "under warning" is also included. The "Resolution on Rights and Responsibilities: Interim Statement by the Faculty of Arts and Sciences" establishes specific procedures for enforcement of these rights and responsibilities. "Plans of Working Group Three" reports the planning and preliminary observations of a sub-group of the Committee investigating possible changes in governance structures. It lists several areas of exploration along with questions the group hopes to see addressed by all interested members of the Harvard community. (JS)

EDO 32859

# *The Committee of Fifteen*

*Created by the Faculty of Arts and Sciences  
Harvard University*

REPORTS, JUNE 9, 1969

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HE 001 159

*To students and officers of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences:*

This pamphlet contains all the statements of the Committee of Fifteen submitted to the Faculty of Arts and Sciences, and concurrently circulated within the Harvard community, on June 9, 1969. These reports constitute a record of the Committee's work to that date under its three charges from the Faculty: 1) "to investigate the causes of the present [April] crisis;" 2) "to assume full responsibility for disciplining the students involved in the forcible occupation of University Hall;" and 3) "to consult with representatives of the other Faculties and with student representatives in order to recommend changes in the governance of the University." As the reports attest, the Committee has been mindful that its several tasks are inter-related and mutually-supporting.

For the present printing a few minor changes, mostly grammatical and typographical, have been made in the original texts. The only substantive addition is that of a single paragraph reporting matters on which the Committee has been working through the summer, with the intention of presenting further recommendations to the Faculty early in the Fall term.

The first and longest document, an "Interim Report on the Causes of the Present Crisis" (page 1), is accompanied by nine memoranda, written by Committee members but as yet not reviewed by the full Committee. Material in the memoranda will be incorporated in a fuller Interim Report, expected to be ready for publication in September, which will also deal with other aspects of the crisis, especially with developments subsequent to the morning of April 10. This report is expected to be ready for publication in September. The comprehensive final report on "the causes of the crisis" is planned for publication in Spring, 1970.

The Committee's report on its disciplinary decisions (page 61) summarizes the Committee's actions in the total of 138 cases presented to it in connection with the forcible occupation of University Hall on April 9-10, 1969. Attached to this report (page 65) is the text of a letter sent to 102 students placed "under warning" for participation in the forcible occupation of University Hall. The letter explains the meaning and the basis of the Committee's decisions. A copy was also sent to each of the other 36 students in whose cases other disciplinary actions were taken.

In three cases the Committee recommended dismissal from the University. These recommendations, which required approval by at least two-thirds of the members of the Faculty present and voting at the Faculty meeting on June 9, were affirmed by a vote of 342 to 29.

The "Resolution on Rights and Responsibilities: Interim Statement by the Faculty of Arts and Sciences" (page 70) states explicitly certain of the rights and responsibilities of members of the Harvard Arts and Science community — students, officers of instruction, and officers of administration — and establishes procedures for protection and en-

*(Continued on inside back cover)*

## INTERIM REPORT ON THE CAUSES OF THE RECENT CRISIS

June 9, 1969

The Committee of Fifteen has been instructed by the Faculty to "investigate the causes of the present crisis." Its Working Group #I, in charge of this investigation, has called for and received statements from many members of the Harvard community and from others as well. It has held numerous meetings, and plans to hold more.

There has obviously been no time to prepare and present a final report. In particular, it has not been possible to cover the crisis of the Afro-American studies program, nor to deal in sufficient detail with the developments subsequent to the dawn of April 10. A later report will, we hope, fill such gaps, and discuss the issues and the events far more adequately.

The Committee finds it nevertheless essential to present at this time the joint conclusions already reached by its members. These conclusions are, we repeat, temporary. They will be improved by future research, as well as by the comments we hope to receive from our readers. But they are based on considerable evidence and intensive reflection. The points outlined here are developed further in the several memoranda attached to this report, and drafted by those members of the Committee who served on Working Group #I. Each of these memoranda both provides some of the evidence and arguments behind our conclusions, and represents the views of its individual author. Their list is as follows:

### Memoranda I-IX

- I. Students: One View (Benjamin I. Schwartz)
- II. Students: Another View (Renee Chotiner)
- III. SDS (Renee Chotiner)

- IV. The Faculty (Stanley Hoffmann)
- V. The Administration (Stanley Hoffmann)
- VI. ROTC (Robert H. Blumenthal)
- VII. The Seizure of University Hall (Stanley Hoffmann)
- VIII. April 10, 1969: The Bust (Robert H. Blumenthal  
and Stanley Hoffmann)
- IX. The Aftermath (Benjamin I. Schwartz)

## II

For a long time, many, perhaps even most members of the Harvard community thought that "it couldn't happen here." They were wrong, mainly for two reasons. First, they probably underestimated the ease with which a "confrontation" can be created. It takes only a small group of determined students. There will always be some diffuse discontent which they can hope to mobilize through action. To be sure, the scope of the drama still depends on two other factors: the catalytic impact of the initial act, and the nature of the response.

Here lies the second reason why Harvard's complacency proved misplaced. We had all studied what had happened in other Universities, particularly at Berkeley and Columbia, but also abroad. Many of us had concluded that Harvard would be spared because the specific issues which had allowed a small group to mobilize support elsewhere — issues related to the nature, policies and specific structure of those other Universities — did not exist at Harvard. There was, it seemed, no widespread "alienation" of the student body, no breakdown in communications between students, teachers and administrators in an academic community with decentralized power and remarkable integration of all its parts.

To some extent, this judgment was right. If Harvard succeeded in recovering quickly from the shock of the events of April 9-10, it was largely because of such factors. However, the recovery is precarious and the shock was colossal. Harvard's resilience is great. But Harvard's complacency has been mistaken, not because it was wrong to believe, say, that the deficiencies of Columbia analyzed by Professor Cox did not exist here, but because the obvious differences between Harvard and other Universities



helped us underemphasize two crucial factors, both of which had become apparent long before the April days, albeit in diffuse and disconnected ways.

On the one hand, the crises *in* the other Universities were mere manifestations of a widespread crisis *of* the University in advanced capitalist societies. It was naïve to believe that a movement as broad and as deep as present student unrest would spare an academic community that prides itself not only on its intellectual achievements but also on its general involvement and leadership role. Indeed, Harvard's pride — some would call it self-satisfaction — only served to delay recognition of the fact that what was happening here was not a succession of discrete loud knocks at the door but the poundings of a tidal wave.

On the other hand, in such a situation — when the traditional University finds itself challenged and questioned and provoked — it is inevitable that structural inadequacies get displayed. For the old structures are simply not equipped for such a challenge. The challenge itself is due in part to the fact that procedures, rules and institutions devised in earlier times are no longer adequate to, or functional for, what the University has become. The myth of the traditional University remains what could be called the Barzun ideology, or the concept of the liberal arts College, or the dream of the temple of learning, disinterested and politically or socially neutral. The reality is of course quite different, as shown by the growth of specialization, research and involvement in public affairs. This discrepancy explains why, in every confrontation, events are actually shaped by the idiosyncracies of the particular University under stress.

It is also easy to see why any serious confrontation can threaten the whole life of a University. As long as there are only minor tests, the old habits and established procedures prevent most members of the community from taking a full view of the crisis. One handles the issues raised one by one, and tries to fit a complex and global challenge into creaky mechanisms that were not set up to cope with such a situation. Now, inevitably, they perform erratically: not well enough to appease the desires of the impatient ones, not to mention the rebels who would anyhow not want these institutions to succeed; not firmly enough for those who see in the challenge a threat; not badly enough for most

people to see how serious the problem is. And so the confrontation comes. If the moment is well chosen, if the issues or demands are of sufficient resonance, if the response aggravates divisions (and it is hard to imagine a response that somehow does not), then into a local incident the following forces can get plugged: student discontent with society and the world, much of which is beyond the University's capacity to handle; student discontent with the University's education, structures, and policies; the strong desire of black students for an aggressive University effort to develop Black Studies; the deep cleavages which this challenge exposes within the University on how to cope with such issues; the particular flaws of the University's patterns of authority and institutions; and, needless to say, the hazards of personality.

It is obvious, finally, that any study of the Harvard crisis can be no more than a short chapter in the sprawling study of the crisis of modern youth and modern academia. It is almost impossible to separate what is true for Harvard alone and what is valid more universally. A complete description of the crisis could try, more rigorously, to focus on the unique features of this community. A summary report on causes can hope to do little more than show how Harvard's concrete case illustrates general propositions, or rather how its peculiar ordeal revealed a general plight.

### III

Like all human institutions moving into a new era, Harvard has suffered from inner structural defects and the inadequacies of accepted practices. To be sure, the University has been anything but an unchanging institution. In the realms of teaching, curriculum and research there has, in fact, been constant innovation. All of these changes, whether good or bad, in what most might regard as the central functional area of the university, have been carried out within the framework of an administrative structure which has been accepted until recently as more or less adequate by most of the constituencies of the larger Harvard community.

What has revealed the insufficiencies of this structure has been

the arrival of a remarkable student generation many of whose members share with their peers elsewhere an enormous dissatisfaction with the world in which they now find themselves. These dissatisfactions express themselves quite differently among different students and by no means affect the entire student community. The expressions of discontent run the gamut from a cultural "hippie" rebellion to extreme political radicalism. Politically concerned students, brought up to trust their leaders and to expect good will and progress from them, have in the recent years undergone an experience which has been tantamount to the discovery of sin, the end of trust and an overflow of guilt for having been acquiescent or "accomplices" for so long. As trust has waned, many students have been impelled to look to the university to provide that which church and state no longer seem to provide. The continuing agony of Vietnam, coinciding with the upsetting political events of 1968, have turned their attention inward onto the university which is their temporary home.

During the academic year which has just ended, there has without doubt been marked escalation of such student dissatisfaction and ferment. The incidents of recent years (the McNamara, Dow, and Paine Hall incidents) were initiated by small groups of students with definite radical images of the world. The issues involved in these incidents produced a much wider impact insofar as they touched on matters concerned with the war. There was thus a large audience prepared to treat the presence of ROTC at Harvard as a symbol of Vietnam and militarism.

The growing involvement of many students with these issues inevitably led to increasing interest in the issue of university governance and the general process of decision-making at Harvard. This led, in turn, to an increased faculty concern with the same order of problems. Discontents on the matter of university governance which had long lain dormant were suddenly reawakened. The concrete result of this new concern with university structure led most concretely to the formation of the Student Faculty Advisory Council and of the Fainsod Committee. The formation of these bodies, far from stalling discussion, actually stimulated further interest in all matters of university administration.

It had already become apparent that the growth of the Faculty



of Arts and Sciences had, by itself, put in question the efficacy of its traditional procedures. The rapid multiplication of new issues — educational, political, procedural, disciplinary — raised by the students brought forth a great variety of responses from the Faculty. These responses often created an impression of confusion. They, along with the new issues themselves, strained further the established procedures, as well as the relations between the Faculty and the group of men who came to be called "the Administration." The former may have appeared, in the eyes of the latter (and of a part of the Faculty itself) more eager for change under pressure than for orderly procedures and deliberations. The Administration, in turn, appeared to many Faculty members too defensive and too slow in (and also insufficiently staffed for) dealing with the new issues. The debate over the disciplinary consequences of Paine Hall revealed the growing distance between a large section of the Faculty and the Administration, as well as between groups in the Faculty.

It was within this context and climate that a new conflict was to arise concerning the status of ROTC at Harvard. A considerable number of the students correctly interpreted the Faculty resolution on ROTC of February 4, which aimed at taking ROTC out of the curriculum, as essentially negative to the continued presence of ROTC at Harvard, even though the Faculty had rejected the outright abolition of ROTC. The resolution itself was not free of ambiguities, and various statements subsequently issued by the Corporation and the President were seen by the same students as emphatically affirmative to the continued presence of ROTC, thus disregarding the spirit if not the letter of the Faculty's resolution.

It would appear that the Administration was strongly motivated by its concern with the effects of the ROTC decision on the outside world. While this concern is entirely understandable, one may well question whether the Administration was responding in this case with sufficient sensitivity to the new climate or to the new need for bringing both faculty and students into the arena of discussion on issues of this type. Given the deep feelings of large sectors of the student body on the war and all matters related thereto, one wonders whether in this instance a concern for the sensibilities of the internal constituencies of the Univer-

sity should not have outweighed the importance of effects on the world outside.

All of these matters had created great ferment and new tensions within the University community. The fact remains that none of these tensions led to any fundamental breach of civility on the part of most students or to any serious break with the commonly accepted rules of university life. The strengths of the Harvard community had by no means been dissipated. None of this directly caused the forcible seizure of University Hall on April 9, even though those who initiated that seizure were counting heavily on the widespread discontents.

In order to explain the seizure of University Hall, we must turn our attention to that group of students within the SDS which had developed a very definite image of the world. This image contained certain well defined components. To these students Harvard University is an integral part of a thoroughly repressive social system. Not only does it service this system with all its experts and elite cadres, but its ruling elements are themselves part of an imperialist ruling class bent on exploiting the entire world. The revolutionary students see themselves as representing the true interests of the popular masses who do not as yet have any true understanding of their own class interests. They remain the victims of a "false consciousness" created by the mass media of capitalist monopoly. The first task of students, however, is to radicalize their own fellow students and thus increase the ranks of the vanguard. The use of militant action against the established university authorities serves to discredit that authority and to radicalize the students.

The small group of students who decided, on April 9, to seize University Hall and to throw out the Deans may have had such aims, and may have wanted to exploit the discontent created by the ROTC issue. Among the "six demands" on behalf of which they seized the building, two referred to ROTC and called for its abolition, thus entering into conflict with the Faculty; one demand dealt with the loss of some scholarship money for students placed on probation after Paine Hall; three of the demands referred to Harvard's expansion, an issue that had previously raised more concern in Cambridge than on campus.

The students who joined the small, first wave, immediately or

later in the day, were moved by very different motives. Some came out of sympathy for the demands, or out of conviction that the ordinary channels were clogged. Others came to bear witness against the Vietnam war, or its symbol on campus, ROTC. Others came out of general dissatisfaction with Harvard education or procedures. Others came out of a desire for solidarity with the occupiers, or for an exhilarating experience. Thus the group in the building was far from homogeneous. The numbers in the building did not exceed 200 to 300, and there was little evidence of widespread student support outside.

There were obvious perils for the University in merely waiting for the occupation to end. The ejection of the Deans — an act of force unprecedented at Harvard — the importance of the building, the presence in it of confidential files of the Faculty and the students, the risk of an invasion of the Yard by outsiders — supporters of the occupiers or self-appointed vigilantes — the danger of more building seizures, the need to show the nation that Harvard would not tolerate disruption, the risk that (as at Columbia) any delay might bring forth student or Faculty sympathy for the disrupters, these were strong arguments for early action.

However, in weighing risks and alternatives at the Council of Deans, the President and the Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences seem to have underestimated the costs of the course of action they selected. Waiting or calling the police at once were not the only alternatives. A third one was available; but it was too easily discarded, or perhaps even ruled out by the narrowness of the process of decision and consultation and by the overriding determination to act without delay. The President could have chosen to present a course of action to the Faculty and the students with the goal of rallying a broad consensus behind him. Such a course could still have been firm and swift, but it would have been aimed as much at mobilizing the loyalty of, and at preventing a further schism in the community, as at putting an early end to the occupation. This was, after all, neither a problem of the legal authority to make a decision in such an instance (this authority was clearly the President's), nor was it a mere problem of management. It was a matter of judgment and wisdom. The way in which the decision was reached and carried

out resulted from, revealed and reenforced the elements of distrust, the problems of faulty communication, and the deficiencies of the decision-making process which had gradually become apparent in previous months. It is true that the crisis was overcome. But it has left deep traces; divisions have been exacerbated despite the remarkable display of a general determination to save and reform the University. Moreover, as long as the deeper causes of the crisis have not been coherently dealt with, there is still a danger of major new explosions.

#### IV

1. The Harvard crisis has many aspects of an American tragedy. It was provoked by a small group of students who had come to believe in a certain explanation of the world that was reassuringly simple and moralistic. They were joined by other students who probably did not share those beliefs, but who had lost faith in the system — i.e., both the society at large and the University. Once the crisis escalated through the use of the police, many more students showed signs of having lost confidence in the University as it then functioned, although not in its capacity to reform. The discovery of sin, or evil, and of guilt seems to justify in the eyes of the "pure," or of those who wish to purge themselves, a resort to violence which is otherwise repulsive to them. Similarly, the conclusion on the part of the President and the Dean of the Faculty that the style of the seizure and the importance of the building justified an early forcible recapture of University Hall unleashed violence again.

It was also part of the American tragedy to have devoted quite some energy and attention to the technical conditions of the police action, but without sufficient concern for the political need of building a consensus behind a decision. Such an effort might not have made the police action entirely unnecessary but it would at least have reduced its scope and its impact. Moreover, despite the technical preparation, unnecessary violence occurred on the steps of University Hall, according to the well known principle that if something can go wrong in an operation of that sort, it will. But even after Vietnam and Chicago, American uses of force have been characteristically marked by excessive self-con-



confidence in expeditious skills, and by the tendency to overestimate the danger of following a less blunt or more indirect course of action.

Finally, it is also characteristic that the University was led into crisis through a series of pressures and pragmatic responses aimed at warding off further challenges but resulting from no coherent and long-term design.

2. The behavior of a small group of militant students is incompatible with the basic commitment and the essential functions of the University. It is not these students' beliefs which we should condemn, whatever one thinks of their underlying philosophy of history and of society. But insofar as they act out their beliefs and claim, on the sole basis of moral conviction and self-righteousness, a right to proclaim that all channels are closed when these channels do not meet their demands, a right to disrupt, a right to assume, so to speak, vicarious oppression and to use the tactics of despair, a right to impose on the majority the views of a minority, it is clearly the right and the responsibility of the University to defend itself, but only in a way that reinforces the community, preserves the main functions of the University, and demonstrates its basic commitment.

3. The students' demands of recent years have challenged both Harvard education and Harvard's relations with society. This challenge raised problems characteristic of all rapidly growing institutions, and especially universities, in free industrial societies:

a. The most important is a problem of leadership. All of Harvard's decision-making bodies seem to function best when they are asked to deal with problems that are brought to them, rather than taking initiatives. This is not sufficient in a time of crisis. In such a time, what is essential is leadership, not rulership, i.e., the capacity for whoever presents a program and takes an initiative to rally behind him as many members of the community as possible.

b. Harvard's existing procedures do not make this easy. Even in normal times, the President is obliged to spend a great deal of his energy on the external affairs of the University. The Dean is overburdened by administration. The Faculty has become huge and unwieldy, it has not yet been able to



redefine coherently the role of the University today, and its own procedures suffer from obsolescence. Each of the many bodies that could be consulted corresponds to a limited function or constituency. Moreover, there is an imbalance between the decentralization of power in the Departments and the Houses, and the fact that the only bodies with University-wide responsibilities are the Governing Boards. As a result, in times of crisis, the distance between them and the lower levels, which is always great, becomes excessive. On top, too few men have too little time to anticipate new problems, tackle new issues, and listen to other voices. Students often come to feel that the normal channels have been exhausted, whereas the Administration and many faculty members think that these avenues are still open. Those structures that are closest to the students — the Departments and the Houses — do not have decision-making power over many of the issues raised by the students, who are thus tempted to apply pressure directly on the Faculty, as the only way of reaching the President and the Governing Boards.

c. The current crisis has put under particularly strong strain those men who, in the traditional design of an integrated community, were playing simultaneously different, but now conflicting roles. The Masters and members of the House staffs are both scholars and men entrusted with administrative and disciplinary functions. As teachers, they have often proved sympathetic to student initiatives and concerns; as administrative and disciplinary officers, they have been asked to carry out plans about which they had not been consulted. The Dean of the Faculty is in a position comparable to that of a parliamentary Prime Minister who must have the confidence of both the House and the President, and whose usefulness is impaired if he can no longer convey to the Chief Executive the wishes of the House. The existence of Administrators with disciplinary powers became a problem as soon as the acts on which they were asked to pronounce were acts aimed largely at them, and which they tended to evaluate more harshly than the Faculty. A new sorting out, a more rational definition of roles is necessary.

d. The paucity of communications between levels and

bodies has led repeatedly to clashes of perceptions and priorities. Naturally, each group or faction has tended to see only the validity and urgency of its own set of truths. This became particularly apparent in the debate over ROTC between the majority of the Faculty and students on the one hand, and the President and Governing Boards on the other. A conciliation was made difficult by the distance deplored above. Attempts at narrowing this distance have often appeared half-hearted, because the bodies appointed by the President for *ad hoc* purposes were rarely fully representative of the range of Faculty (not to mention student) opinions. As a result, even moves designed to display flexibility may have created an impression of rigidity. The compartmentalized structure of Harvard at the lower levels, the distance between these and the Governing Boards, the insufficient participation of the students, have inevitably contributed to making students and Faculty more aware of their own feelings than of those of the outside, while the President and Governing Boards have remained more focused on the world at large (but not enough on the immediate environment) — hence dangerous misunderstandings, leading to a mutual lack of trust.

4. In this crisis it is difficult not to stress the responsibilities of the Administration (particularly its top echelons). Had it shown greater trust in the members of the Faculty and student body, much of the impact of the "bust" could have been avoided. If one could trust them to bring the community back to normalcy after so traumatic a shock, why couldn't one have trusted them in working out a less divisive alternative? It is true that outside pressures and alumni discontent would grow if the University demonstrated its incapacity to assure discipline and order. But the best way of showing strength consists of relying first, not on what is in effect outside intervention, but on the vast internal resources of loyalty and reason. The policy chosen showed firmness, but little imagination and not enough trust. Moreover, by adopting after April 9 statements that, had they come earlier, would have, if not prevented the disruption, at least considerably limited the malaise which the disrupters sought to exploit, the Corporation may have reenforced the conclusion of many that

the use of ordinary procedures is a waste and that only the strongest pressure pays.

5. There is a view according to which it is the lack of firmness on the part of the Faculty, its failure to enforce rules and its haste in meeting coercive demands which is largely responsible for the crisis. The record, however, is more complex. The Faculty did not condone disruption, but it could not disregard the legitimate part of the student demands without provoking discontent and explosions. Indeed, the grievances that were partially met were not those presented by the coercive disrupters. Meeting demands strains the traditional processes; but any period of rapid change has that effect, especially when those processes are one of the stakes of the transformation. Had the more moderate students not been able to feel that a sizable fraction of the Faculty understood their point of view, the crisis, when it came, would have taken on far greater proportions. It can even be argued that the scope of the crisis might still have been reduced, had more of an effort been made on April 9 to separate the most militant of the disrupters from those who joined them for a variety of reasons.

Moreover, it is difficult to argue that a large body of young men and women can be kept in the ways of law and order just by strict application of existing rules. For the many who come from so-called permissive homes it is probably too late in their development to convince them of the virtues of a rigorous enforcement of limits at the college level. One can, and must, explain why these rules are indispensable, and see to it they be obeyed, but one cannot inject a sense of order and a respect for procedures if one does not deal also with substantive issues and goals. As for those — still quite numerous — who come from non-permissive homes, the strict enforcement of discipline per se, to the exclusion of anything else, would only trigger rebellion. The issues raised in recent years are both unavoidable and essential, even if the "demands" presented over them are often unacceptable. There is no escape from the conclusion that in a University, whose vital functions must indeed be protected, the only way to ensure their defense is to combine firmness (not authoritarianism) on behalf of these functions with a sweeping reexamination and restructuring of the institutions, procedures, habits and

policies that are being challenged by many more than the disrupters. What is true for any nation applies to the University as well.

6. One must therefore come back to the idea of a crisis of the modern University. The traditional University was a certain kind of community, quite hierarchical, yet, in the case of Harvard, integrated. The vast expansion of Harvard's teaching and research, greater diversity in the student body and in the Faculty have shaken the old kind of community and led to increasing stratification and strains. The old foci of integration, such as the Houses, are victims of this pattern. There is an intense desire for a new kind of community that would preserve the autonomy of Houses, Departments or Faculties, but would be less restricted, less hierarchical, and would recognize also that each of the University-wide or Faculty-wide component groups — Administration, Faculty, students and staff — has its own rights and responsibilities and must therefore have some share of the common task of redefining the purposes and processes of the University.

It would, of course, be a mistake to believe that "restructuring" will not create its own problems, or can by itself resolve either the dilemmas of size or the grave substantive problems that range from curriculum reform, or experimental education, to Harvard's and Harvard's professors' relations with the "industrial-military complex." These issues would arise even if SDS disappeared, and there are deep divisions in each segment of the community about them. A reform of structures and processes is nevertheless necessary, not only because substance and procedure are intertwined in the "demands" of many, but also because the existing machinery does not allow for a fruitful and exhaustive discussion of these issues. The mushrooming desires for "radical" courses or critiques is not merely a symptom of political or emotional rebelliousness. It points to the need for going to the roots of the present discontent, including the desire of the young for fuller participation. The University cannot, by its decisions, make this discontent disappear. But Harvard can exert leadership in showing both that legitimate new procedures and rules can be developed by common consent, and that the gap between what so many students expect from a Harvard

education and what they receive can be narrower without any loss of standards.

The actions of a few, and reactions of some, may have turned a diffuse malaise into a crisis. But the common sense, moderation and passionate desire for reasoned discourse, cohesion and progress, which all sections of the community, and quite specifically the students, displayed after the crisis must be preserved and strengthened.



## MEMORANDA

### I. STUDENTS: ONE VIEW

Benjamin I. Schwartz

*This document has been written by a member of the Committee of Fifteen who has served on the working group studying the history and causes of the recent crisis. The paper has not, however, been reviewed by the Committee, and is therefore not a Committee Document.*

Students at Harvard have, of course been no more immune than students elsewhere to the unrest, discontents and general ferment which have engulfed an entire generation. One may contend even now — after our recent turmoils — that Harvard possesses certain unique features as an academic institution but one must set out from the assumption that our students are above all part of their student generation.

The general literature on student unrest in our times is already unmanageable both in volume and in range of interpretation. An interim report of this type can hardly presume to offer anything but the most tentative suggestions concerning the theme of student unrest in general in spite of its burning relevance to our own situation. It is possible, however, to discern in this vast literature at least two approaches which may well affect the manner in which different people perceive and respond to the phenomenon of student unrest. These approaches are by no means mutually exclusive and no doubt most of us would draw on both in formulating our own interpretations. But the difference in emphasis may have significant implications. One approach tends to focus attention on an analysis of the behavior of the students themselves. It is concerned with the psychological and social causes of their behavior. While explanation by no

means involves judgment the fact remains that a considerable number of those who emphasize this approach seem to be asking "What is wrong with so many of our student youth in a civilization which in all its essential aspects is moving in the right directions?"

One might mention and comment briefly on some of the most widely held explanatory interpretations. There is the view which stresses the enormous effects of permissive child-rearing on our society as well as the permissiveness of educational authorities. We are, in this view, faced with a generation of upper middle class youth who have been led to expect instant gratification of their demands whether these be demands for satisfying experiences or demands for social justice. There is probably much validity to this view but it might simply be remarked at this point that it is most difficult to begin to cope with this problem on the level of university education.

Closely linked to the problem of permissiveness is the view which stresses the vacillation, uncertainty, and general abdication of authority in many areas of society. It might be pointed out that the crisis of authority in our times is by no means confined to the relations between generations. In many areas of our society and culture we seem to be moving from a period of tacit acceptance of constituted authority to a period in which authority must work hard to clarify and justify the bases of its existence. To the extent that the vacillation of those in authority reflects an uncertainty about their own values and beliefs, we are dealing with a crisis of culture rather than simply a crisis of authority. Such a crisis is not likely to be resolved simply by a more forceful reassertion of authority unless such a reassertion can be totally repressive.

Others have emphasized the unprecedented affluence of a considerable portion of the present student generation and its lack of a felt need for career achievement in the conventional sense. This again may explain much negatively but does not in itself explain the positive directions into which the concerns of the affluent young have moved.

Others have pointed to such unique features of our contemporary social environment as the effects of new media of communication. Television and cinema — which have turned the

minds of youth from a taste for learning and abstract thought to a concern for immediate emotional and sensual impact.

One could, of course, go on with an enumeration of explanations, all of which no doubt enter as ingredients into the social psychology of the present student generation. There is, however, another approach which would tend to focus, in the first instance, not so much on explanations as on an effort to understand and relate to the perceptions and sensibilities of the discontented students. Since their perceptions and sensibilities tend to involve a feeling that "something is wrong out there," anyone who adopts this approach must also be as much concerned with the "world out there" as he is with the students themselves, even though he may never accept their sweeping judgments. He must take seriously the implicit and explicit questions which some of the young are raising about our civilization even when he may not accept their answers.

Some who favor this approach may be devotees of a sentimental cult of youth. They may believe or desire to believe that a generation has finally emerged which by dint of its moral purity, idealism and intuitive comprehension has indeed found the answers to all our tragic problems. It must be emphatically stated that the effort to understand and relate oneself seriously to the perceptions and concerns of the young by no means need imply a belief that they have found the way to the New Jerusalem. It does imply that those who are professionally engaged in dealing with the young — whether they be administrators or faculty — must now devote an enormous effort to understanding and communication. We may feel that we have wisdom to transmit, some of which runs counter to some of their fashionable slogans but we must think hard about new ways of communicating this wisdom. Fortunately or unfortunately this effort will probably be incompatible with the simple continuation of old routines.

Turning our attention from general considerations to the Harvard situation during the academic year which has just ended, one discerns throughout the year — and particularly in the last few months — a notable rise of the discontents and ferments — both diffuse and specific — which have been discussed above. The larger stage was of course set by the continuing agony of

Vietnam and the disheartening events of the year 1968. The conjuncture of these events seems to have produced a decline of faith in the political process in a country where a kind of civic religion has always been of peculiar importance.

There is, to be sure, a considerable portion of our student body which has been involved only marginally or not at all with the tendencies described above. Deep personal convictions, strong professional commitments, the immersion of the perennial scholar in his own pursuits and other motives have led many to stand on the margins or even in opposition to the prevailing tendencies. These students may have as much or more to do with shaping the future of the world as their vociferous fellow-students. While some of them resented the turmoil of recent months, none showed any inclination to launch "backlash" counter-action. By the very nature of things our attention tends to focus on those who played more active roles.

At the other pole we have those who have been fully committed either to various forms of cultural rebellion or to political radicalism. At this point I shall leave out of consideration the students who tend to cluster about the Students for a Democratic Society, not that one can erect an iron wall between the SDS and the rest of the student body but because of particular role which a given group within that organization was to play in the recent events.

Between these groups we find that intermediate sector which has since come to be called the "moderate" group. These are students who while carrying on their academic work deeply shared in the growing malaise and dissatisfaction on many specific issues. It was probably among this group that the disappointments of the year 1968 produced their most serious impact. One indeed sensed in some the yearning that the university itself, as a corporate entity, might come to play the redeeming role in society which church and government no longer seemed to play. This turn inward toward the university probably played no small role in intensifying the controversy over the relevance of the curriculum which led — among other motives — to such large involvement in a course which promised "Radical Perspectives" on American life.

Within this context we shall consider the Dow Incident of

October 25, 1967, and the Paine Hall Incident of December 12, 1968, only in terms of their effects on the student body as a whole and on the faculty. While these incidents were initiated by small groups of radicals, it would appear in retrospect that the issues raised in both cases did arouse a sympathetic response within a much larger segment of the student community without necessarily arousing any widespread approval of the tactics involved. If Dow did indeed heighten anti-war sentiments and if small groups were indeed successful in making ROTC a symbol of Vietnam and militarism, this was because the resentments in this area were already deeply rooted.

It must also be candidly stated that the two incidents in question did tend to draw attention more forcibly to the issue of university governance. They stimulated the desire of students to participate in certain areas of decision-making and also focused the attention of the faculty on the decision-making process. The issue had, of course, already been raised within the student body here as elsewhere in the academic world. Within the faculty, certain long dormant dissatisfactions were suddenly brought to life. The net result of these dissatisfactions was the creation of the Student Faculty Advisory Committee and of the Fainsod Committee. As might have been expected, however, the creation of these two bodies far from stilling the issue of governance tended to foster further concern. The issue naturally became a central concern of the newly formed SFAC. The issue of governance once having been raised would no longer be stilled. Thus, a new climate was created in which the continuation of administration as usual was no longer adequate to the times. It was probably no longer wise to reach deeply critical decisions without involving the other constituencies of the university.

It was within this context that the ROTC issue was to assume considerable importance. It would appear that even before the Faculty meeting of February the ROTC had become the symbol of Vietnam and militarism for many students. While it is quite true that the Faculty resolution on the ROTC was unclear and that faculty members had voted for the Resolution on many different grounds, many students interpreted the spirit of the Resolution as essentially aimed at weakening the presence of ROTC at Harvard. The subsequent statements of the President and



Fellows, the statements in President Pusey's letter to Dean Ford and particularly President Pusey's statements at the SFAC meeting of March all seemed to interpret the Faculty Resolution in a manner favorable to the continued maintenance of ROTC at Harvard. It would appear that apart from their personal views, the Corporation and the President were above all conscious of what they regarded as the detrimental effect on the outside world of either a negative interpretation of the ROTC issue or even of silence. One can by no means assert that administrators should always defer to the sensibilities of sectors of the student body. Given the profound feeling of a large part of the student body on issues related to the war not only at Harvard but in the nation at large, in this instance, it would have been wiser to place more weight on the sensibilities of students than on the possible effects on the outside and perhaps even on alumni. Nothing could have a more profound effect on the outside world than the disintegration of the university community. The danger that issues related to war might lead to such results was one that clearly existed.

While the issue of ROTC and the question of restructuring had created genuine discontent, before April 9th, the issue of Harvard's expansion in Cambridge was not an issue central to the concerns of most students. The issues of Harvard's relations to the outside community are by no means unreal and there undoubtedly have been sins of omission and commission in this area. There had, however, been an administrative response to this issue in the form of the Wilson Report. Yet the efforts to arouse discussion of this report had found little response among students and faculty.

In short, in the months preceding April, there had indeed been a heightening of student agitation and unrest in general and in connection with the ROTC issues and the issue of restructuring in particular. This agitation would have probably continued to increase and would have required increasing attention from administration and faculty. A clarification of the ROTC issue was clearly called for and would probably have been achieved. There is, however, little evidence that this growing ferment on the part of a large sector of the "moderate" students would have led to anything like the forcible seizure of University Hall. On

the contrary, the vast majority of students continued to behave with civility and within the framework of commonly accepted rules. In spite of the growing distaste for "mere matters of procedures" the fact remains that the meetings of the SFAC were conducted with strict attention to proceedings. For many reasons, the framework of community life at Harvard did indeed prove stronger than at many other institutions. Given the crisis of the times, however, one could not assume that the framework was absolutely impregnable.

## II. STUDENTS: ANOTHER VIEW

Renee Chotiner

*This document has been written by a member of the Committee of Fifteen who has served on the working group studying the history and causes of the recent crisis. The paper has not, however, been reviewed by the Committee, and is therefore not a Committee Document.*

Students at Harvard are faced with problems that are both general to their generation and unique to their life at Harvard. They, of course, are not immune to the unrests, discontents, and general turbulence endemic among their peers and in their world. They experience crises of personal identity and of social and metaphysical criticism and doubt; and these crises often occur during their years at Harvard. The University, then, is the scene of their troubled times, but it often is an additional cause of the troubles. The April crisis at Harvard can be seen as a reflection of three basic forms of unrest: the universal form experienced by young adults in all cultures and all times; a more particular form prevalent among the young in 1969 America; and a form specific to Harvard and similar academic institutions. The more general unrests lay the foundation for the specific grievances, and the specific grievances in turn accentuate the general unrests.

The most "universal" unrest is, of course, nothing new. It

derives from the process of maturation, during which young people begin self-definition and grapple with the existential questions that sensitive people must face. This kind of malaise did not "cause" the forcible occupation of University Hall, for in that case University Hall would be occupied every day. However, it would be dangerous to ignore this generalized factor in an examination of the sources of the building seizure and the widespread reaction to it and to the police bust. This generalized unrest laid a deep foundation for more immediate sources of discontent.

This universal questioning has made young people in America particularly sensitive to very real social grievances in 1969. The War in Vietnam, poverty, and racism are the three most flagrant examples of what many students see to be a society riddled with evil and injustice. The young feel indignant about such gross flaws, and at the same time they feel powerless to effect change. They face a mass society in which every person seems to be only a tiny cog, and they feel alienated from it in consequence. Their alienation leads either to retreats, to nihilism, or to intense efforts to change that world. But in the last case, the young see little effect from their efforts, and the frustration thereby increases. The anti-war movement and the Civil Rights movement (and its Black Power descendant) are a decade old. Students have been major participants in both of these drives for substantive reform. In spite of the depth, the breadth, and the duration of these movements, to students there appears to have been either inadequate progress or none whatsoever. An intense commitment to change which brings no satisfactory response can only foster feelings of helplessness and alienation. Petitions, election campaigns, protest marches, picket lines, letters to Congressmen, and canvassing simply do not appear to influence those who form and execute policy in America. As a result, students begin to resort to extra-legal forms of persuasion, which are taken seriously, draw attention to the issues, and demonstrate the degree of commitment of those who engage in them.

The resort to extra-legal tactics also reflects another aspect of the crisis of modern American youth. There is widespread challenging of authority, which both derives from and results in the sense of impotence. This challenge extends not only to *figures*

of authority (such as parents and presidents, of either the nation or the university) but also to the traditional *methods* of getting things done. Procedures are called into question, and young people begin to think that election efforts are futile (such as the McCarthy campaign) and committees are useless. In the extreme, this critique leads to the notion that if one wants something he simply should go and get it.

Spontaneity is a large part of the youth ethic. It relates to the impatience for achieving social change and to the tactics employed toward this end. It also relates to a more amorphous manifestation of the youthful critique of mass society, the manifestation of the hippie culture and the drive for communalism. Alienation from impersonal society can lead not only to withdrawal, defiance, or commitment to reform but also to visions of a different and a better world. To a large extent, those visions recently have been ones of a new sense of community, of love, personalism, and sharing. At the same time that young people strive for independence from their childhood dependencies and from what they see as a badly-flawed society, they strive for inter-dependence in a new community of those who share their ideals and their goals. Hence discontented students often identify strongly with each other and often support each other in demonstrations of their grievances and their goals. This drive for community, often expressed as solidarity, was certainly an important part of the occupation of University Hall. A small minority may have seized the building, but a much larger number joined the occupation throughout the afternoon, the evening, and the early morn. Those who joined may or may not have agreed with the six demands or those who led the seizure or with the tactic of seizure. Some agreed with neither, but felt the need to support those who had acted, who had demonstrated commitment to their vision of a better Harvard and a better world, who had courage, and who shared something in a society of atomized men. Inside University Hall there was a sense of community, of purpose, and of effectiveness. Such an atmosphere could not but be appealing to students who felt lonely, disaffected, bored, and helpless.

This phenomenon of solidarity and the appeal of spontaneity to young people is reinforced by the decline of religion in the



modern world. Religion traditionally created group identification among men, and its frequent emphasis on salvation fostered a kind of future-orientation. As organized religion has become less meaningful in young people's lives, they have had to create their own group identifications (so often lacking in mass, depersonalized society), those identifications often taking the form of peer-group and protest solidarity. The decline of religion has also in a way undermined the traditional future-orientation of so many people. The present-orientation which has replaced it in part explains the appeal of spontaneity to young people. If one is not living in expectation of God's reward, then the present moment must in itself be made meaningful and beautiful. Thus action and community have gained import in consequence of a diminishing emphasis on religion.

Spontaneity plays a large part in young people's lives in the form of their impatience, their desire for communalism, and their present-orientation. The sources of such a drive are difficult to identify; but perhaps one such source, in addition to the decline in traditional religion, is the mass media. The present college generation is the first to be reared with television. Although the impact of media should not be overemphasized, it cannot be emphasized too little, either. Television differs from radio and the print media in that it is based on pictures and actions rather than on words. The prevalence of television-viewing in the lives of the current college students may in part explain their emphasis on action rather than on speech. Television implicitly teaches children that nothing is real unless it happens, and so students enact that implicit lesson and react to their political frustration by trying to make things happen. TV, then, contributes to the value placed on action among the young, to their present-orientation, and to their drive for spontaneity.

Young people in America are affected, too, by the violence which they see all around them. There may not be quantitatively more violence in the world than there always has been, but certainly its plays a different role in young people's lives than it has ever before. Youth is more exposed to it because of the expansion of media coverage of wars, riots, and the like. In addition, many students have had personal "encounters" with the police in the context of protest demonstrations or have viewed such



episodes on television. The increased exposure to violence has accustomed young people to it: such exposure has in a way inured them to violence until it has come to be regarded as a normal and common mode of behavior and institutional operation. Thus the forcible occupation of a building seems hardly extraordinary. In a sense, violence has been "legitimized." However, although violence may have become a regular part of life, exposure to violence has at the same time outraged young people. The outrage has been directed against institutional violence such as the War or the police in Chicago, and consequently students react strongly against the calling of police onto campus. Chicago both outraged and radicalized many young people: it cannot be underestimated as a source of the Harvard student strike after the April 10 bust. Exposure to violence has led not only to outrage and to a new concept of what is legitimate, but it also has contributed to the suspicion of authority which many young people so often feel. Not only did Lyndon Johnson not halt the War nor the Democratic Party nominate Eugene McCarthy (therefore indicating to students that established forms of protest are useless and "the authorities" are not to be respected and trusted), but Lyndon Johnson escalated the War and Richard Daley called his brutal police (indicating to students that the only "response" to their protests which they can expect is a violent reaction). Exposure to violence, then, has contributed to young people's mistrust of authority. And a part of that mistrust certainly has been manifested in the concentration of protest against ROTC. Not only does ROTC symbolize the War (which so many students view as immoral and unjust), but it also symbolizes authority in the form of the military. It, then, is a natural target for students who abhor institutional violence and who mistrust authority (in part *because* of that institutional violence). The paradox of abhorrent violence and "legitimized" violence is difficult to reconcile. That paradox, however, may not be necessarily a contradiction. Just as students are often led to believe because of the impotence they feel that if one wants something he should go and get it, they also may believe out of frustration that the only way to fight violence is with violence as a last resort.

The unrest thus far discussed has been of a nature to which youth in general or specifically American youth may be suscept-

ible. Just as universal doubts and crises lay the foundation for a modern American malaise which they can accentuate, the contemporary national discontents set the scene for a highly particular form of Harvard unrest. There are several sources and dimensions of the disaffections at Harvard, and they easily can be common to other competitive academic institutions. The current college generation was schooled in an intensely competitive secondary school contest, partly because of a rising drive for national achievement after World War II. They were motivated to "produce" in order to get into college, especially into Harvard; thus they expected to find satisfaction once that goal was reached. Coming to Harvard was, for many, a very disillusioning experience; for perhaps what it taught them more than anything else was that Harvard was at most a means to an end rather than an end in itself. Not only was Harvard not *the* answer to all of their questions and doubts, but it did not *give* them all of the answers which they sought. At most, Harvard enabled them to *find some* of their own answers. This first shock to many students that Harvard could not be a permanent goal laid the foundation for further criticisms of and discontents with the education which they would receive while here.

Those criticisms encompassed the nature of the University, its internal structure, its context within the larger society, and the education which it offered them. For many, Harvard's structure became the main source and target of dissatisfaction. The University is large, highly bureaucratized, and often impersonal; and thus it often reinforces, let alone fails to mitigate, the alienation from mass society which so many students feel. The problems created by the size, decentralization, and impersonality of the University are only aggravated by the poor network of connections and modes of communication within it. The House system and the *Crimson*, for example, try to mitigate the impersonality of a large university, but by now both have proven inadequate for the task.

Students arrive at Harvard anxious to discover its famed "community," only to discover that no such thing exists. The structure of decision-making at Harvard has been of serious concern to many students during the recent past. The remoteness and often-felt unresponsiveness of the Administration reinforces stu-

dents' feelings of alienation and of helplessness to determine their own fates. Both the distance of the Administration and the impotence which students feel give rise to the notion that only disruptive protest will draw attention. Although the immediate issues in such protests are rarely University structure, the fact that such protests are necessary indicates structural problems. Dow led to SFAC; Paine led to limited student participation in faculty meetings; University Hall led to student voting on a Faculty committee. Certainly the responses to these protests did not immediately answer the issues raised, but hopefully greater student participation in University decision-making will alleviate the need for such protests. Structural problems within the University certainly do exist: the creation of the Fainsod Committee and the "moderates" April 10 call for restructuring (even at the level of the Corporation) attest to that. And these structural problems are one source of student discontent and alienation at Harvard.

But structure is only the most superficial cause of student unrest. The contemporary college generation views the university in a new way. This generation sees a badly flawed society and seeks a viable institution to "do good" in the world. In a very real way, the Church and the State have failed them, and so they have begun to test the university. In their eyes, the university should be an active participant in the world around it and should commit itself on moral issues. It is for this reason that many students seek the abolition of ROTC, a re-evaluation of Harvard's expansion policy and the creation of a Black Studies program. Such actions both would be symbolic and would have an impact on society at large. Those who administer the university and those who teach in it often have a more traditional view of the university as an apolitical, neutral seat of learning. But students have a different view of learning and of the role of the university in society: they often feel that neutrality can be immorality; and because of the unresponsiveness of other institutions, they turn to the university as a last resort to stimulate social progress. As one student said, "As long as ROTC is at Harvard, this will not be a pure church; and without a pure church, there can be no grace."

Not only the view of the role of the university in society is

different among students, but so too is the view of the function of education. A Harvard education always was intended to train young people for positions of leadership and status in society. With the grievances which the students have against contemporary American society, and with the alienation from it which they feel, it is natural for them to doubt the desirability of entering such positions. Consequently, a Harvard education appears much less instrumental to these students, and they seriously criticize it. Because of this decline of instrumentalism, questions of the "relevance" of a traditional Harvard education arise in the minds of students who see neither occupationally nor philosophically desirable options in the world surrounding them. These doubts make students receptive to acts of commitment, such as protest demonstrations, in which they can find a sense of purpose, self-definition, and self-assertion. For some, the occupation of University Hall was a way of making Harvard meaningful in the context of their lives. The decline of instrumentalism and the questions about the relevance which it has fostered are manifested in such movements as Soc. Rel. 148/149 and the drive for Black Studies. To many students, political ends become more important than academic ones; for politics is immediately meaningful to these students, whereas scholarship can promise them very little. "Involvement" is valued more highly than study. This critique of education is not a rejection of sustained intellectual discourse, it is merely a redefinition of the purpose of education: the debate is not over *whether* to learn but rather over *how* and *what* to learn. If these students do not want to enter the traditional roles in society for which Harvard always has prepared people, then they want Harvard to expose them to those things which *will* be meaningful and instrumental.

### III. S.D.S.

RENEE CHOTINER

*This document has been written by a member of the Committee of Fifteen who has served on the working group studying the history and causes of the recent crisis. The paper has not, however, been reviewed by the Committee, and is therefore not a Committee Document.*

The SDS chapter at Harvard has in the past been small. This year, however, its ranks have been larger than ever before. This may be due to a changing nature of students who enter Harvard; that is, each year the incoming Freshmen may be more "radical" than the outgoing Seniors. Or it may be due to a general process of "radicalization" which Harvard students are undergoing because of national and international events. For example, as the Vietnam War continues, opposition among the student population increases. In addition, the events in Chicago last summer — both in the Convention and in the streets — may have further alienated students from authority and from traditional political methods. Most likely, both the turn-over in the student body and the radicalization of students while at Harvard have contributed to the increase in SDS's following this year.

Throughout the 1968-1969 academic year, both students in SDS and others concerned with the issues of ROTC and Harvard expansion conducted campaigns to foster change. Beginning in the fall, SDS canvassed in the Houses and gathered more than 1200 signatures on a petition to abolish ROTC. The same issue led to the Paine Hall sit-in and in part to the seizure of University Hall. Also beginning in the fall, some students participated in the Cambridge Peace and Freedom Party rent control campaign and began investigating Harvard's plans for expansion. All indications show that many more students were concerned about ROTC than about the expansion issue, but SDS had been active on both issues throughout the year.



SDS activity at Harvard in the past had been directed primarily at external targets, such as the Dow Chemical Company and the Defense Department in the person of Robert McNamara, although that activity also challenged University rules. This year for the first time the radical critique was focused primarily upon the University and its policies. This change of focus has also occurred on other college campuses in the recent past.

The specific issues raised by SDS this year gained support among a large number of students. Some supporters were concerned primarily with the resolution of specific issues. To others, the particular issues were symbolic of the larger society, and this group sought to take the first steps toward revolutionary change. It would appear that at least a certain sector of SDS was determined to engage in some form of highly militant action this spring in order to discredit authority and to radicalize the student body.

Those students who view ROTC and Harvard's expansion as exemplary of an evil society find it both logical and effective to strike out against Harvard. In their view, the University trains personnel for leadership and ownership roles in a repressive and oppressive society; and the university is a symbol of that society. Since efforts at radicalization and revolution on a national scale are more difficult to organize and less likely to succeed, it is natural to begin the revolutionary work in a significant place where perhaps *some* success can be achieved.

The connections between Harvard and an unjust social system are quite clear in the minds of those who seek revolutionary change. They point to the members of the Harvard Corporation as prominent American capitalists and to Harvard's history of training political leaders. They maintain that the presence of ROTC at Harvard displays the University's role in training military personnel to enforce America's capitalist interests abroad. And they maintain that Harvard's expansion displaces workers from their homes (and thereby oppresses those workers) for the sake of increasing the University's capacity to train for capitalism.

Those who hold this view of the University did not necessarily want to destroy Harvard but rather wanted to rebuild it in a new image. Their cry of "Shut it down!" can be likened to the Defense Department's rationale for a "pacification" action in Vietnam:

"We had to destroy the village in order to save it." To students with this perception of American society and of Harvard's role in it, the University was the appropriate target for revolution, and non-violence was not a necessary part of their creed. If the University hierarchy was an inseparable part of an evil ruling class, the radical revolutionaries (because of their true grasp of the nature of the world in which we live) view themselves as the authentic representatives of the interests of the popular masses. The masses, to be sure, have been misled by the communications media, which are controlled by capitalist monopolists. Those masses, in time, will accept the guidance of a conscious revolutionary vanguard. More immediately, revolutionary students in the University must do everything possible to increase the vanguard and to enlighten the masses. Radicalization of fellow students and revolution within the University is the means toward that end.

The decision to seize University Hall was a consequence of many factors. The militant tactic such as the seizure of a building could draw attention to the issues at hand, and a violent response from the Administration could radicalize students. In addition, because of the generalized unrests among students as a whole, the small group that initiated the occupation of University Hall must have realized that Harvard in 1969 would be a somewhat receptive climate for such action.

#### IV. THE FACULTY

STANLEY HOFFMANN

*This document has been written by a member of the Committee of Fifteen who has served on the working group studying the history and causes of the recent crisis. The paper has not, however, been reviewed by the Committee, and is therefore not a Committee document.*

Faculties are vulnerable for three reasons at least. First, as Eric Erikson has observed, faculty members are often closer to their own adolescence than other people of comparable age. Not only

contact with students but a life devoted to what is the young person's main condition — learning — account for this phenomenon. There is no need to resort, on a large scale, to the unconvincing explanation of an unconscious fear of, or of a conscious desire to be loved by, the students.

Two, even in places where the faculty exerts the broadest powers over curriculum, research, appointments, or discipline, the governing boards have essential powers that cannot remain unchallenged when, suddenly, nothing less than the future orientation of the University and of its relations with society is at stake. Just as students demand, directly or not, a share of the faculty's and governing boards' power, the faculty also often feels that its viewpoint is not sufficiently understood "higher up" — so that the more radical reformist members find here another reason for sympathy with the students, and the more conservative ones are caught between their desire to save the University from the current challenge and their own doubts about the compatibility of the status quo with self-defense.

Thirdly, most faculty members are not professionally prepared for this challenge. They were recruited for their competence as scholars, and their administrative experience has often been limited to the management of an existing research or teaching unit, such as a Department. To be sure, some may have had a broader experience in public affairs, but of a nature that does not necessarily equip them for the handling of an academic crisis. For different reasons, most academics are not, to use Albert Hirschman's phrase, "reform mongers", either on a grand scale or for the academic world. They may be intellectual or emotional revolutionaries, they may be experienced in the political management of institutions other than Universities, they may (quite frequently) have a genuine horror of the manipulations, compromises, intrigues, and fatigues of the political world — but few of them are experts in a field which is both new and elusive: the governance of the University as a political institution. It is not to ordinary academic politics that this sentence refers — the politics of appointments and allocations — but to the extraordinary needs of times of general reexamination, when not only interests and ambitions and habits but fundamental values and very broad policy choices are involved. However much one sympathizes

with administrators and professors used to committee work who lament about the unwillingness of the average professor to play a responsible, i.e., time consuming, role in the governance of the University, it remains true that even they are not always prepared for what this role requires today.

The Faculty of Arts and Sciences had for some time been showing the strains that resulted from the contrast between the old ideal and the new realities. Those strains, which would have existed even in quiet times, could not fail both to be magnified by, and to exacerbate, the crisis. The Faculty Room in University Hall was made for a small and cozy group of professors, whose infrequent but stylish meetings served to socialize an even smaller junior faculty, and to discuss educational problems in a world where the governing boards were remote and the students studious — or at least gentlemanly. The numbers were small enough to assure sufficient communications with the Dean and contacts with the committees, standing or special, all selected by the Dean, in which complex issues were discussed and whose recommendations were usually ratified after orderly debates. The rapid growth of the size of the faculty, and particularly the increasing numbers of junior faculty, could not fail to affect subtly the tried and tested ways. The rejection, several years ago, of major recommendations of the Doty Committee on General Education pointed already to the convergence of a problem of structure and an issue of purposes. For the homogeneity of the faculty was threatened not only by its growth in numbers but also by its increasing diversity. Next to what might be called traditional liberal arts or college professors, engaged in undergraduate teaching, there were more and more scholars primarily concerned with specialized graduate training, men interested above all in research, and men of affairs.

This diversity showed that the University was no longer in fact based on any single coherent conception. Methods of instruction had remained traditional — just enough to irritate those students in quest either of new forms of learning or of new realms of experience. But the diversity of purposes and the proportional decline in the importance of teaching were sufficient to dissatisfy both radical students hostile to all aspects of the *status quo* and less politicized students in search of closer personal contacts with



professors. None of this would have sufficed to produce a crisis, had it not been for the escalation of the student "revolution" since 1966, and for its focusing on the University itself.

The faculty was asked, in short succession, to take a stand and consider measures on general public issues (cf. the discussions of the draft, December, 1966–January, 1967); on issues growing out of Harvard's connections with society at large (the problem of recruiters, Spring, 1968; the Wilson report, ROTC); on educational changes connected either with social changes (the Rosovsky report; coeducation) or with student demands for loosening and broadening the curriculum (independent study, pass-fail); on suggested changes in faculty rules (attendance by and participation of students); on the disciplinary consequences of collective disturbances (McNamara, Dow, Paine Hall). It was inevitable that the faculty's very diverse responses would feed the flames and magnify the crisis.

This was so, first, because the responses were too diverse. They often were reactions to student pressures, or to initiatives of individual faculty members. It was quite proper for the faculty to respond since these were undeniably issues of vast importance and not mere whims of a handful of students. But these responses took the form of disconnected discussions of discrete demands — i.e., of the kind of pragmatism in which what is truly important gets subordinated to what appears urgent. This was not always the case. The Rosovsky report and its adoption by the faculty represented an important achievement. But the diversity of responses entailed three consequences.

One was a goodly amount of confusion and uncertainty. A detailed study of the voting record of the faculty would show a pattern of oscillation — fluctuations from meetings in which big steps were made to accommodate student grievances, to meetings in which proposals moving in the same direction were either slapped down altogether or rejected in favor of weaker substitutes. Similarly, it would be hard to reconcile the attempt by the CEP to maintain control over ungraded courses, or over the transformation of discussions (or bull sessions) into courses, or even the description of courses in the catalogue, with the phenomenal and uncontrollable growth of Soc. Rel. 148-9 — a fine example of pragmatism. This confusion was most likely to cre-



ate both the feeling that strong pressures would yield results, and disappointments with rebuffs, especially over highly symbolic issues (the draft, or student attendance at meetings, or the Paine Hall scholarships).

A second consequence was what might be called the Tocqueville effect: revolutions break out, not when things are at their worst, but when changes begin to be made, yet expectations (and disappointments) outpace those changes. A third consequence was the creation of a kind of multiple unreality. When the faculty dealt with traditional problems, well within its domain, the seriousness of the studies did not quite conceal a certain impression, if not of irrelevance, at least of inadequacy. When the faculty dealt with the more explosive issues, the air of unreality resulted both from a lack of ultimate decision-making power, and from the valiant but transparent attempts at couching inevitably political issues in academic terms. (There were, of course, exceptions: the discussion of the Rosovsky report, a potentially explosive issue approached with imagination and boldness, and the absence of any debate on the Wilson report — except that the failure to discuss it may well have been a prize example of unreality.)

A second major problem was the damage done by this "acceleration of history" to the procedures of the University. There is no need to retrace in detail the problems of the Administrative Board, the overturning by the faculty of some of the Board's recommendations after Paine Hall, the rejection by the faculty of the CEP resolution on ROTC. Obviously, committees established to deal with certain types of problems and trying heroically to fit quite new kinds of issues into their routines, could not but suffer from the strain. Elected students who participated in SFAC often accepted compromises in order to facilitate consensus and to convince the faculty of their reasonableness, yet several of SFAC's resolutions were rejected or mutilated by the faculty. The impatience of many students with the overall institutional scheme was thus aggravated, for they felt that the only body to which they had gained full access was not taken sufficiently seriously by the faculty and administration as a whole. At the same time, the existence of SFAC, and its attempt to deal once again in piecemeal and reactive fashion with delicate issues,

pointed up both the relative inadequacy of the existing committee system and the occasional competition between the old and the new (cf. ROTC). In 1969, the creation of the Fainsod Committee, partly as a response to pressure for student involvement, did not save the faculty from having to pronounce almost immediately again over the issue of student membership in the Fainsod Committee itself.

A third reason why the faculty's responses fed the crisis is that they contributed to the division of the faculty. Faculty permissiveness, or unruliness, or confusion, was seen by many faculty members as a major accelerator of the crisis. Those men who had for many years played an important role of senior statesmen on the principal committees were particularly annoyed by the spectacle of faculty meetings with fluctuating membership, resolutions offered from the floor, improvised legislation, and frequent recriminations. They were convinced, rightly, that a large body cannot, so to speak, be left unguided. But they did not see clearly enough that the old forms of guidance could no longer cope. On the other side were those men (often younger ones) who thought more about the need to face the whole range of new issues than about the need for rules and order, or who realized that rules were needed but had no chance of being tenable unless they corresponded to a broad consensus. These men may, in turn, have been guilty of underestimating the degree to which the diversity of faculty responses may have made an explosion more rather than less likely, or else they have been in no position to offer a comprehensive plan for reconstruction. Each side was best at seeing the flaws of the other. One group suspected the other of wanting to, or of helping to, politicize the University. The other group feared that rigidity would accelerate a politicization which was anyhow dictated by the events and which many members of that group deplored. The very fact that the line of separation was drawn either over the issue of the *style* of faculty response to student pressures ("hard" vs. "soft") or over the issue of the degree of desirable student involvement (what might be termed "participation vs. consultation"), detracted from a full exploration of all the other issues. Meanwhile, there was a growing split between those who rallied to the defense of the old procedures, and those who sometimes felt

closer to some of the students ("moderates" or radicals) than to several of their colleagues, and increasingly estranged from and unrepresented in the existing mechanisms. There were bizarre alliances. On one side, there were radicals hostile to the present university, reformers who accepted it more or less as it is, yet lamented the obsolescence of its institutions and believed that only new ones could have real authority, radical reformers who shared a bit of both viewpoints. On the other side, there were traditionalists insufficiently aware of the changes that had already brought about a glaring contrast between their ideals and the actual operations of the university; there were also pragmatic managers aware of the obsolescence of the old ideals, mindful of the inadequacy of the institutions, yet primarily concerned with saving what existed, i.e. with rejecting the radical challenge and adjusting the old structures without any weakening of authority.

Looking back, one can see more clearly how the behavior of the faculty could be interpreted in a bewildering variety of ways. Nobody could deny that the faculty was on the move: the distance covered between the tabling of a motion on the draft in December, 1966, and the vote on ROTC in February, 1969, the introduction of limited student participation in debates, the creation of the Fainsod Committee and the Afro-American studies program all showed how much motion there had been. And yet, it had not really satisfied anyone. To many faculty members, the faculty's failure to redefine coherently the rights and duties of members of the community had encouraged probes and pressures. To many students, the key facts were not the steps taken but the steps avoided, the failure of the Faculty to adopt even à propos of ROTC a clear stand on the war, the slowness in accepting student involvement, the combination of attempts at enforcing discipline and of concessions. What some saw as piecemeal change, others denounced as tokenism, and some as a breakdown of governance. Fortunately, most of the members of the faculty, despite their disagreements, shared a strong commitment to the university. However much their ideas about it differed, they agreed that the worst way to save it was to have it destroyed. Insofar as this same commitment and loyalty was shared by the bulk of Harvard's students, the crisis, which the inevitable splits had fostered, could still be overcome.

## V. THE ADMINISTRATION

STANLEY HOFFMANN

*This document has been written by a member of the Committee of Fifteen who has served on the working group studying the history and causes of the recent crisis. The paper has not, however, been reviewed by the Committee, and is therefore not a Committee Document.*

The very reference to "the Administration" is an indicator of the crisis. A few years ago, there was no general term encompassing so diverse a group of men, some of whom, members of the Corporation and of the Board of Overseers, have only few or intermittent contacts with the academic world, and some of whom, deans or assistant deans, are distinguished scholars. But then, there was little talk about "the establishment" either. The groups, functions or men thus designated have existed for quite a while, but they had not been seen or perceived as a group before.

In the case of Harvard, two factors account for the development of the concept, or of the term. The first is the growing importance of executive functions. Harvard's very determination to innovate and experiment, its search for a more diverse student body, its proliferation of research centers and institutes made inevitable an increase of bureaucratic *activities*. Miraculously enough, the University has succeeded in keeping the *numbers* of bureaucrats extremely limited. This means that many scholars are part-time administrators within their own Departments or programs (a factor that reinforces the trend to pragmatic management). It means also that the University-wide or college-wide administrators are overburdened and tend inevitably (even if they often differ in their roles) to see themselves as a separate group, for primarily functional reasons. Like the growth in the number of faculty members, this is by itself a source of strain, for even though a Harvard "administrator" — especially if he



holds a teaching appointment — usually sees himself as a public servant who carries out the decisions of the Faculty, what is true in every modern bureaucratic organization — in the nation as well as in a corporation — applies to the University. The “Executive” does far more than execute. Whatever his mythology he either governs in effect or at least shapes the decisions made by the actual rulers. When, in addition, “the Executive” is a very small and overworked group, there is a built-in problem of information and communications, which can be solved only by prodigies of finesse and political sensitivity.

As in the case of the Faculty, a second factor of crisis has been the student challenge of recent years. The Faculty could (which does not mean that it always did) take up the intellectual or moral implications of this challenge, or reflect on the changes needed in its own procedures. But “the Administration” — from the President to the assistant deans — inevitably had a different set of preoccupations and priorities. On the one hand, any bureaucracy is charged with carrying out existing rules, and must worry about precedents. Once there appear collective challenges of and, pressures on, rules, the fear of the opening wedge or of the hole in the dam easily overcomes or rules out sympathy with the protestors’ motives or goals. Whereas today’s protestors are mainly goal-oriented, “the Administration” is functionally concerned with means and procedures; whereas the former are champions of their causes, the latter is worried by their acts. Both sides are quick to turn minor frays into important symbolic battles. The former tend to see in every small demand the symbol of a bigger need; the latter tends to see in every minor breakdown the symbol of potential chaos. It may be excessive to contrast here the moralists (students or faculty) and the managers. For the managers too are normally — especially here — men of high moral principles. But their moral concerns, which range from the defense of the University against any attack, to the preservation of individual rights against collective pressures, are not the same as the challengers’. Also, whereas some of the protestors go pretty far toward saying that their good ends justify the means, “the Administration’s” moral concerns are often expressed more subtly, in procedural detours rather than in eloquent harangues.



Moreover, the Administration's constituencies far exceed the Faculty. They include, inevitably, the whole nation, insofar as the Administration's universe is constrained by state and federal legislation and by the need for funds from alumni, foundations, or public sources. Indeed, the members of the Administration often serve as intermediaries between faculty members and various elements in the nation. Even in normal times, the Faculty's concerns often look too narrow or too parochial in their eyes. Insofar as the student challenge was an obvious cause of anti-academic resentment in the nation, and insofar as Faculty sympathies for student demands seemed likely to intensify this "backlash," the position of the Administration could not fail to become difficult. It is hard to escape the conclusion that in this delicate situation the Administration has responded to the crisis with singular defensiveness. This does not mean only that its members have interpreted the mounting student pressure as an attack on established ways, as indeed it was, and radical student demands in particular as an attack on the University itself, as it tended to become. It means also that the policy adopted toward this pressure, while neither hostile in tone nor intransigent in detail, has been — as in the case of the Faculty — primarily to respond rather than to lead. Indeed, more than in the case of the Faculty, the response often appeared or sounded grudging, too literal at times, or too indirect, or too bureaucratic. It means, finally, that too little effort was made, not only to anticipate and ward off "demands" by tackling genuine issues over which students were not the first to express discontent (such as the so-called expansion issues), but even to appear to take seriously the suggestions or recommendations of students or faculty members. No effort, for instance, was made either to have the Wilson report debated by the full Faculty or its proposals carried out.

Here it becomes impossible to analyze the crisis without referring both to the specific events and to the peculiarities of the structure. First, one must remember that student protest was originally aimed much more at the Administration than at the Faculty, which could afford to be detached. The McNamara episode involved a student demand for a public debate with the Secretary of Defense, who had come on a "private" visit as a guest of the Kennedy Institute, whose creation had not been

applauded by all members of the Faculty. The protest against Dow challenged a policy about recruitment that was partly managed, so to speak, by the Administration (it was also partly carried out by the Departments, but it had not been reexamined by the Faculty for a long time). The attack on ROTC, and the spotty but growing interest in the expansion issue, not only concerned areas in which the Corporation had the power of decision, but also challenged long established Administrative policies such as the contracts with the military services and Harvard's policy of minimizing its impact on Cambridge. Not until Paine Hall was there a direct challenge of Faculty procedures, but even that one was tied to ROTC.

Secondly, Harvard's administrative structure did not make for an easily concerted response. The Corporation is isolated from the students and the Faculties — including the administrators of those Faculties. Neither the student body nor the members of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences have an easy access to the President. The Council of Deans is a consultative body concerned more with administrative matters than with University policy. The Dean of the Faculty is in the difficult position of representing both the President to his Faculty and his Faculty to the President. As Dean, he must respect the fiercely defended autonomy of the Departments. He cannot take sweeping initiatives without grave risks, or without spending much more time on rallying support than on carrying out his administrative functions.

The structures and powers that exist at the top levels, adequate for ordinary times, are questionable in time of crisis — and yet when University-wide issues are raised, there are no structures and powers elsewhere. Harvard's highly decentralized structure is normally an excellent protection against authoritarian rule from the top (and the revolts it breeds). But it also makes concerted change difficult, and does not assure sufficient communication and information between levels, and especially not between the administrators (part-time or full-time) in a given faculty, and the President and Governing Boards. The vital link, here, is the Dean.

At this point, it becomes impossible not to take into account the role of personalities. Dean Ford has conceived of his func-

tion as Dean in a scrupulous and rigorous way, which made of him literally the guardian of the rules and procedures, the executor of the Faculty's decisions and of those Governing Boards' policies that relate to his Faculty. This was a perfectly tenable conception as long as there was either no clash between the Faculty's decisions and the Governing Board's policies, or no disagreements of consequence between him and the positions adopted by his own Faculty. But his very concern for due process and orderly procedures made him less than fully sympathetic to what looked to many others besides him like hazardous improvisations, premature concessions, capricious injuries to established procedures, or needlessly unpleasant discussions. As a man who had taken a sharp stand against the war, but wanted to protect the University from the disruptions of political stances, as a scholar committed to dispassionate research, as a Dean aware of the fragility of the institution, he was obviously not happy with the trend. He would have preferred that the Faculty take and hold a coherent line instead of waging a piecemeal rearguard action. Yet his conception of his role did not allow him to take initiatives that could prove divisive. He did play a leading role in one important area—the development of Afro-American studies; it is assuredly not his fault if during the crisis created by other forces, the program to which he had devoted so much energy came under attack for timidity. He had tried, here and elsewhere, to combine traditional procedures and a sense of motion. But in the area of Afro-American studies, there had been so much more leeway, since one was almost starting from scratch; and even there, the crisis broke through the procedures.

It was becoming increasingly difficult for the Dean to carry out the wishes of the Faculty *and* to save traditional procedures, to make clear his growing discomfort with initiatives he deemed dangerous *and* to avoid taking some of his own. Uncharacteristically, at the meeting of January 14, he moved a resolution to confirm the Faculty's past practice of limited attendance at its meetings, but it was tabled. At the meeting on ROTC, on February 4, he did not show his preference, but the result was a defeat for the CEP's motion. At the meeting on March 4, he announced that he might, in effect, have to change his own policy, take unpopular initiatives, and then ask for a vote of

confidence — an announcement that recognized the need for leadership, yet entailed a serious risk. If the initiatives were going to be taken against the wishes of a sizable Faculty group, Faculty divisions would increase. If there was no sufficient attempt at building a consensus either before or after an initiative was taken, a genuine crisis of confidence could occur. The Dean's statement underlined his distress at the evolution of the Faculty. One of the by-products was the impairment of his capacity to represent to the President the sentiments of his own Faculty — a capacity on which the President must rely, given his own distance from the daily activities of the Faculties.

This, in turn, left the President in an even more isolated position. He had, in earlier days, exerted strong moral leadership by his resistance to Senator Joseph McCarthy, and his Presidency has been rich in achievements. But neither his personal style nor his strongly held beliefs were in tune with the mood — not to mention some of the manifestations — of the student malaise. To him, the thrust of the SDS action was clearly an attack on the University. It was the University's duty to defend itself against the "Walter Mittys of the Left," for only then could the University repulse the intrusions and injunctions of the outside world, a world which the President did not at all deem as evil as did his critics, and for which he wanted Harvard to keep producing leaders. To many students, members of SDS or not, the main enemy was that outside world, even if (or especially when) its attack on the University took the insidious form of drawing the University into "complicity." Insofar as the University participates in injustice, through cooperation or silence, to act against such complicity is for many students not an attack on the University but a vindication of what the University ought to be.

Between such clashing views, conciliation would in any case be difficult. What compounded the misunderstanding was, on the one hand, the students' tendency to interpret the President's strongly asserted personal views as official policy, and on the other hand, the rarity of direct contacts that could have gone beyond a dialogue of the deaf. To the President, the demands presented over the past two years by SDS were intolerable both because of the way in which they were brought forth and because



of the assumptions on which they rested. They could indeed not be taken seriously. To the students, and many members of the Faculty, they deserved to be taken seriously, despite the intolerable methods and exasperating myths of SDS, because some of the issues to which they referred were real. Again, the stage was set for acrimony. The "Administration" would resent what it saw as the failure of Faculty members to assert their own dignity and to stand behind the Administration by resisting student pressures and manipulation. Or it would resent the attempts by Faculty members to conceal their political capitulations to expediency behind a barrage of technical or *ad hoc* resolutions. Many Faculty members, in turn, would resent what they saw as the presence of a voting bloc of administrators capable of determining the outcome of a vote in a polarized Faculty, or the attempt by members of the Administration to tell the Faculty what to do (cf. the Paine scholarships issue). The "Administration" would also tend to get impatient with the students' demands and point to the wealth of points of access available to them. The students (including moderate student leaders) would point to the grudging quality of the response to their requests.

Especially after the debate on the disciplinary effects of Paine Hall, in which some critical remarks were addressed to the Administration, and which revealed the split on the Administrative Board, many members of the Administration of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences felt hurt, or isolated, or out of sympathy with an unpredictable Faculty. They feared that the Faculty's behavior would make a major disruption more likely. The examples of unrest elsewhere, the constant rumors here encouraged discussions among University officials, or members of the Corporation, or members of the Council of Deans, about what to do in case of such a disruption. At the higher levels, these discussions never amounted to real contingency planning, although the President was authorized by the Corporation to call the police in case of need. At the lower levels, detailed contacts were established between the University Chief of Police and the Cambridge police.

There was no doubt that the responsibility for the maintenance of order (as contrasted with decisions on discipline) was the President's. But the issue was not merely one of legal authority



and management. It was an issue of fundamental policy. Unfortunately, the problems of communication and confidence made it even less likely that a serious effort at planning a concerted effort in case of a crisis would be made, that priority would be given to strengthening the weakened internal disciplinary procedures of the University, so as both to deter a crisis and to cope with it within the University itself in the first instance, should it occur. The facility with which, in March, King Collins and his men were removed through police cooperation may have contributed to what might be called technical optimism — optimism about easy police action and relative acquiescence — the reverse of pessimism about what could be expected if things were left or even submitted to the Faculty and the students. But there may have been another reason as well: the case of Columbia had been abundantly discussed, and two of the lessons Professor Cox had stressed had been the cost of waiting too long, and the harm done by too many well-meaning, would-be mediators from the Faculty. Analogies are dangerous. There were, we believe, very few Faculty members at Harvard who would have really wanted to mediate and bargain with the seizers of University Hall. The issues here and there were quite different, the disproportion between the seizure and the demands, their provocative character, were obvious, and the cohesion of the Faculty, despite the deepening divisions, was still solid. But wrong analogies tend to become self-fulfilled prophecies.

## VI. ROTC

Robert H. Blumenthal

*This document has been written by a member of the Committee of Fifteen who has served on the working group studying the history and causes of the recent crisis. The paper has not, however, been reviewed by the Committee, and is therefore not a Committee Document.*

The groups described above (radical and moderate students, faculty, administrators and Corporation) had long avoided open antagonisms. As 1968-69 progressed, however, the often con-

flicting interests of each group began to emerge; the conflicts emphasized relative strengths and weaknesses of each group in the decision-making processes of the University, and a general feeling of mistrust was created in all sectors of the community. Around no issue was this divisiveness and mistrust more apparent than that of Reserve Officers Training at Harvard: as the most immediate symbol of the Vietnam War on the Harvard campus, ROTC became the most widely debated issue of the year.

The view held by the radical students (SDS) was the most elemental: ROTC was totally immoral. By training officers for the U.S. Armed Forces, ROTC was in fact training killers to suppress peoples' revolutions and to support American imperialist policy both at home and abroad. The Vietnam War is the prime example of how the American military practices genocide and oppression, but it is not the only example. In the eyes of the SDS, ROTC had to be abolished at Harvard. They knew that this was in all likelihood a minority view, and opposed suggestions for a referendum; then argued that majority rule does not settle basic issues of conscience.

The viewpoint of moderate students was formed more specifically by their opposition to the Vietnam War than by a general view of American foreign policy; hence the moderate response was more complex. Many moderates were hesitant to accept an "abolish ROTC" position because of a commitment to the notion of free participation and free expression within the University. These moderates did find it easy to attack ROTC's privileged status as an accredited area of study subject to non-University control, and thus they were satisfied with reducing it to extra-curricular status. It was felt that if this step were taken, the University would no longer be endorsing ROTC.

The faculty, of course, has the power to make academic policy, and on the issue of ROTC the faculty was split. A small minority of the faculty favored the SDS view, as expressed in the Putnam resolution. But a large majority, remembering the events of past decades, could not assume such a negative stance on the question of military training. This large majority could be split into two groups: those who wished to maintain ROTC in as close to its present form as possible; and those who, to varying degrees,

wished to weaken the position of ROTC at Harvard. Many in the last group shared the sentiments of the large body of moderate students; ROTC will have to accommodate itself to the wishes of Harvard, and if it could not (which many believed to be the case), then it should not exist on this campus.

Several groups within the University presented motions designed to alter the status of ROTC at Harvard. The four which finally reached the faculty were: the Putnam (SDS) motion, which asked for the abolition of ROTC at Harvard; the Albritton (SFAC) motion, which dealt only with the academic status of ROTC and basically tended to make ROTC an extracurricular activity by removing course credit from ROTC and ending the teaching appointments of military instructors in the Faculty; the Wilcox (HUC) motion, which is a milder version of the SFAC motion; and the Wilson (CEP) motion, which formally recognized the students' right to military preparation, and allowed for renegotiations with the Defense Department and a strengthening of the ROTC courses.

After an initial discussion of the issue at the December 3 meeting, the Faculty planned to vote on the several motions on December 12. The meeting never took place, however, as SDS sat in at Paine Hall to demonstrate their demand for the abolition of ROTC. The Paine Hall demonstration seemed to have little effect on community attitudes towards the ROTC issue, although the sit-in did lead to limited student participation in faculty meetings. The ROTC motions finally were discussed on February 4, and the debate in that meeting typifies the conflicting views of the issue held throughout the community. The motion finally passed was slightly a "toned-down" SFAC motion, which, while adopted by many faculty members for diverse reasons, was undeniably unfriendly to ROTC. This amended SFAC motion was approved by a vote of 207 to 125.

The ROTC controversy should have ended here, yet in fact it had only begun. Many faculty members and most students interpreted the spirit of the resolution to be quite hostile to ROTC. It was now up to the military to say whether they could accept the terms demanded by the resolution. If they could not, they should not be allowed to maintain units at Harvard. The President and Fellows were the one group that solidly supported

the presence of ROTC at Harvard. To the Corporation, ROTC appeared to be in the best interest of the country, and therefore in the best interest of Harvard. They felt that the University had the duty to provide the military with highly-educated officer personnel. The Corporation, along with many other faculty members who had supported the CEP resolution, chose to interpret the faculty vote in the narrowest manner possible. In a letter to Dean Ford on February 19, President Pusey stressed the fact that the faculty had voted down the Putnam resolution by a huge margin, thus proving to the Corporation that the faculty wanted to keep ROTC at Harvard. The letter did not mention that the faculty had also turned down the CEP resolution. It was true that the text of the SFAC resolution was limited to primarily academic issues and many faculty members had voted for it with different motives. But it would not have been difficult to discover the intentions of those who had drafted the resolution and presented it to the faculty. Nowhere more than here was the conflict of constituencies apparent: the faculty was turned toward the students, the Corporation toward the nation. The letter left many with the impression that the Corporation appeared to be willing to do everything in its power to accommodate the presence of ROTC at Harvard, thereby going against the spirit of the February 4 vote. The fact that the ROTC negotiating committee, appointed by the President, contained no faculty member who had voted for the SFAC motion only added to the growing lack of trust.

The tension over the negotiations was further increased with the statements of President Pusey at the SFAC meeting of March 25. After SDS had marched through the meeting (even though it was supposed to be closed) demanding the abolition of ROTC, President Pusey told SFAC that he favored the ROTC program and made other comments critical of current hostility to the military-industrial complex. The President became noticeably vague when asked about student opinion. This meeting left most students and faculty with the feeling that the President was ignoring the expressed desires of the academic community at Harvard.

At the faculty meeting of Tuesday, April 8, Dean Glimp was asked to clarify the confusion surrounding the ROTC negotia-

tions. After he and Dean Ford had spoken, many in the faculty were still confused over the future of ROTC. The faculty, however, was willing to give the negotiating committee time to reach an agreement with the Defense Department. Some students were not as patient.

## VII. THE SEIZURE OF UNIVERSITY HALL

Stanley Hoffmann

*This document has been written by a member of the Committee of Fifteen who has served on the working group studying the history and causes of the recent crisis. The paper has not, however, been reviewed by the Committee, and is therefore not a Committee document.*

The events of April 8-9, prior to the calling of the police, amounted to the deliberate creation of a limited crisis with a dangerous potential.

Those who went to the SDS meeting on Tuesday, April 8, noted a considerable difference in tone from earlier meetings. Militancy was greater, the desire for rapid and decisive action was more intense. It is true that three successive votes produced a narrow majority against an immediate seizure of a building. But the fact that those who were against any such action had to support a resolution that advocated a seizure later, and the ardor of the meeting, assured the most militant faction that it would probably be followed if it decided to strike anyhow. The six demands were adopted at that meeting. The first three were proposed by the New Left; they called for the abolition of ROTC, the replacement of ROTC scholarships and the return of scholarships to the students put on probation after Paine Hall. The three demands that called for an end of Harvard expansion had been proposed by the Worker-Student Alliance.

For those who were eager to act, the moment seemed ripe. Students had just returned from Spring vacation; hour exams were over, final exams far away. Moreover, ROTC had reemerged



as an irritant; the *Crimson* on April 8 carried Dean Glimp's interim report, that of April 9 a long account of President Pusey's earlier appearance at SFAC. Insofar as ROTC was a symbol of Vietnam, we must also remember that after a lull of several months the persistence of the war had again come to the fore of many consciences. And it was a lovely Spring day.

The seizure of the building, shortly before noon, was an efficient and swift operation preceded by a tambourine. A small group of men and women, several of them unknown to the deans, ejected the deans and prevented them from reentering. The deans' resistance was little more than symbolic, but the force used in throwing them out was more than that. It *was* symbolic, too, insofar as Harvard had previously been immune from violence; and in some cases, serious injury was avoided only by chance, or because of the intervention of other students. The evicters came with chains, keys, and bars; they knew exactly where to go. The rifling of the files appears to have occurred early (except for some investigation into PRL scores). Meanwhile, other students streamed into the building. Many of them had voted against an immediate seizure the night before, but once the deed was done they joined in support of their friends. They did not always seem to know what they were going to do, whether they were going to sit in, mill in, or walk through. Some of them watched the ejection of the deans without interfering. Outside, on the steps, the holders of bullhorns harangued the crowd which had assembled. The mood of that crowd was anything but friendly. There were SDS sympathizers in it, but they did not move into the building, and the mass of those who booed the speakers was much larger. A demand by one of the speakers for a vote led to a negative result, followed by the speaker's denial of any significance in the vote.

It was obvious that the seizers of the building had failed to attract the kind of mass support they had hoped for. Later, different sorts of speeches, addressed to larger issues than the six demands, succeeded in convincing more students to join. Dean Ford's announcement and warning at 4:15 P.M. was received with mixed feelings by the crowd in the Yard; the closing of the gate was not popular, and the injunction to the students in the building to leave, failing which they would be subject to prose-

cution for criminal trespass, sounded ominous. Few persons seem to have left the building. In the Square, onlookers and numerous young people unconnected with the University and attracted by the news multiplied. But in the Yard the crowd — never very large — diminished. The meeting which Deans Ford and Glimp held in Lowell Lecture Hall at 5 P.M. was sparsely attended.

Later in the evening, two sets of developments were worth noting. First, in the building itself, the group of several hundred occupiers seemed to be marked by considerable diversity and uncertainty. There were constant political discussions in the Faculty Room, but also many students bored with indoctrination and eager above all for solidarity and the exhilaration of risk and adventure. Members of the SDS tried to restrict access, through at least one door, to supporters of the six demands, but other doors were not so guarded. There was much discussion of whether the police would come and a vote to remain non-violent in that case. Many appeared to have given no thought at all to how the adventure would end, had the police failed to come. Many realized that while there was a small crowd of onlookers outside, and a stream of visitors, there was no evidence of great enthusiasm, and very few more permanent arrivals. That this was a source of worry for the members of SDS is shown by their decision to send some of them to Memorial Church, where sympathizers had assembled, in order to tell the latter to return to and agitate in the houses and dormitories. Little of this proved effective. By pouring into the building, and repeatedly declaring the demands non-negotiable, SDS had locked itself up, physically and mentally. Not only the bulk of the non-SDS students, but many members or friends of SDS had, this time, refused to take so big a step. On the one hand, the militants were tactically split; on the other, the militants who had decided to stay in the building were surrounded by other students whose reasons for joining were not at all those of SDS. It was a motley group. But the deans who had been ejected, and who had either gone to the Council of Deans, or remained excluded from any further decisions, had only seen the "storm troopers" of noon, and (unless they had time to listen to WHRB's remarkable reporting) they knew little of what was happening now.

Secondly, outside the building, besides a very small and fluctuating group of faculty members exchanging guesses and often sharing feelings of impotence and frustration at being left, figuratively and physically, in the dark, there also were clusters of students. They were few in number, although the closing of the gates had proved ineffective. But among them were the leaders of several student organizations, such as HUC, HRPC, or the Young Democrats, as well as the chairman and former chairman of SFAC. They disapproved of the seizure and of the six demands — indeed most of them had never been on good terms with SDS. But they had their own reservations about the administration, and they feared that a hasty call to the police would only aggravate the schism in the Harvard community, bring support to the SDS, and perhaps divert attention from the issues of student involvement, or restructuring, which they had raised and SDS had always mocked. Around 9 P.M., they had drafted a document which both warned against a police action, and recommended precautions in case the police were called anyway. They suggested that the operation take place only in daylight, that spectators be cordoned off, that “ample forewarning” be given, and that University officers escort the police. Approximately thirty students participated in the drafting of this statement, which fifteen signed as leaders of various organizations. Three of them reached Dean Glimp, gave him the document, and returned believing that no decision had yet been made. They also undertook to call for a meeting the next morning at 10 at Sanders Theater, hoping that there would have been no police action by then. But most of the Deans were not informed of this decision, and it was anyhow too late.

## VIII. APRIL 10 – THE BUST

Robert H. Blumenthal  
and  
Stanley Hoffmann

*This document has been written by two members of the Committee of Fifteen who have served on the working group studying the history and causes of the recent crisis. The paper has not, however, been reviewed by the Committee, and is therefore not a Committee Document.*

It is extremely difficult to determine after the fact whether most people did or did not expect a building to be taken at Harvard. Many in the University adopted an "it can't happen here" attitude; the Administration, on the other hand, seems to have had the idea of a seizure on its mind for most of the past year.

While no real contingency plans seem to have been drawn up, the Corporation and the Council of Deans, which comprises the Deans of the several Faculties and the President of Radcliffe, spent much time during the year discussing how to react to the possibility of a takeover. The examples of several other schools were studied, but the primary lessons seem to have been learned from Columbia. Archibald Cox, author of *Crisis at Columbia*, spoke several times with members of the Administration and the Corporation. Chief Tonis of the University Police and other Administration members visited Columbia during the year. Tonis had also had discussions concerning the possibility of a disturbance at Harvard with both the Cambridge Police Force and the Massachusetts State Police. The one decision which had been made was that, in the event of a building seizure, the response of the Administration would be determined by President Pusey in consultation primarily with the Dean most vitally concerned.

The Council of Deans was convened at President Pusey's home around 1:00 p.m. on April 9. Some of the officers of the Administration ejected from University Hall came to report. The only

course of action that appears to have been seriously considered and which the Deans were asked to discuss was the quick removal of the students in University Hall with the help of outside police. Deans Glimp and Epps were sent to meetings of the Administrative Board (circa 2:30) and the House Masters (circa 3:30) to report the tenor of the discussion at the President's home. To the Masters the suggestion was strongly conveyed that police would probably be called in that afternoon, although it still seemed possible to follow the non-violent King Collins precedent. The decision to lock the gates and have Dean Ford read a statement was announced, and Masters and Senior Tutors were asked to go into the Yard to encourage their students to leave it. At 4:15, Dean Ford read a statement from the steps of Widener which announced the locking of the gates and stated that anyone remaining in the building after 4:30 p.m. would be liable to charges of criminal trespass. Masters and Senior Tutors found it impossible to convince people to leave the Yard, and returned to their houses: they did not hear from the Administration again until the bust, or later.

The first plan having failed, deliberations continued at the President's home. The Deans of several Faculties other than Arts and Sciences left early. Members of the Corporation had been kept informed and had agreed to allow the President to make the decision he deemed right. Sometime between six and seven that evening, the final decision was irrevocably reached by the President: to call in the Cambridge Police, supported by Massachusetts State Police, at 5:00 a.m., Thursday morning, April 10.

In our investigation, several reasons have been given for the decision to use the police the next morning. We find all of these reasons open to question:

1. The style of the occupation. It was, indeed, intolerable. But, as is shown in Appendix VII, the composition of the group in University Hall became much more diverse and heterogeneous during the day. Not all of the occupiers would have remained militantly intransigent had a different strategy been selected by the President.

2. Outsiders. The reason most often given to support an early bust is the fear that outsiders would be drawn into Harvard Yard



if students were allowed to remain in the building, thus creating a truly unmanageable situation. This was a definite possibility, although few outsiders had yet arrived in the Yard on Wednesday: the Boston University SDS had entered the building in the afternoon, but quickly left. As for the future, a more determined effort at keeping the gates locked could have been made, while still allowing any member of the University to enter and leave the Yard. The danger from outsiders was an argument *against* indefinite waiting, rather than *for* the decision which was actually made.

3. Significance of University Hall. University Hall has been referred to as the most vital building on campus, the nerve center of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences. Yet one can argue that the long-term damage to the University would have been much less if University Hall had not been recaptured so quickly. It is unlikely that much vital business was conducted inside the building during the next several days.

4. Files. While it was not a major factor in the decision, the importance of the highly confidential files inside the Hall was on everyone's mind. Most of the file-rifling, however, had been done by 4 P.M., a fact that the deans should have been able to ascertain. There was strong pressure inside the building against any more theft. Further rifling, a real possibility, would have increased divisions among students in the building and the opposition of students outside.

5. More buildings. Many in the Administration knew the scenario at Columbia quite well, and felt that several additional buildings would be taken. This seemed quite unlikely, however, since most students outside the building were extremely hostile to those who had seized University Hall (the response in House dining halls and the Union on Wednesday night, plus the response at Memorial Church even after the bust corroborate this impression.) The people inside University Hall might have tried to take another building, but it is more likely that they would have chosen to maintain their solidarity inside the Hall.

6. Outside pressures. There seems to be a widely held belief that the outside community wanted President Pusey to call in the police. One Cambridge official has reported that Cambridge had discussed the possibility of taking independent police action,

yet no one in the Administration considered this a likely event, and it is doubtful that Cambridge would have taken such action without the consent of the University. Many also argue that the calling of the police allows President Pusey to appear in a position of strength, both to the alumni and to the federal government; yet surely it is the resolution of the crisis, and not the police action, which must be of utmost importance in the eyes of both alumni and Congress.

7. Costs. President Pusey has said that he expected that his decision would create a hostile reaction from 2000 students, to last about ten days. He considered this to be a lesser cost than that of allowing the occupiers to remain inside of the building.

Given our reservations on the other six points, we believe that President Pusey overestimated the dangers of any delay, and underestimated the costs of the course he chose.

Two elements of the decision to bust early are particularly disturbing. The first concerns the predictability of police behavior. The President and others felt that state police would be best suited to handle the operation; but state police can only be called in by local police in support and under the direction of local police. As to the question of guidelines for the police, it was clear that no outside agency could impose any on a police operation. Given the known brutality which occurs in massive police actions, the President should not have been so quick to call the police; or else, far more detailed efforts should have been made, both in order to avoid brutality and in order to have members of the Administration and Faculty accompany the police. But there was a reluctance to inform Faculty members, because of possible leaks, and the police objected to letting Deans move in with them.

This points to an even more disturbing element — the Administration's total lack of consultation with Faculty members and students. A strong and convincing case could be made against merely waiting until the occupiers of University Hall left the building. But no attempt was made at presenting this case to Faculty members and students, and a third alternative — to propose a certain course of action and to ask for Faculty and moderate student support — was not seriously discussed. There were risks to this course also, to be sure. But it would not have

amounted to inaction. The Faculty and students consulted on a specific course would have been under strong pressure to go along, or to make constructive suggestions, and thus would have become involved in a process that would have been less costly, at the end, for the community. The Memorial Church meeting, already scheduled for Thursday morning to discuss the occupation, and known to Dean Glimp, would have provided an excellent opportunity to reach, consult and mobilize the community. Nor should it have proved impossible to call a Faculty meeting.

And there existed smaller bodies, such as S.F.A.C., or the group of moderate students, that could have been drawn into the process if the larger ones were deemed too uncertain.

Calling the police early, and in this way, was the decision with the most serious implications for the immediate future. It made the Administration's condemnation of violence sound one-sided. To invoke the right of self-defense is one thing, to limit it to an action decided in such a fashion is quite another. To argue that some disruptions are so serious as to require firm and early action is one thing, to say that in this case the advantages of haste and secrecy outweighed those of broader consultation and a more complex strategy is far less convincing. The invisibility of the Administration on April 10, on a campus where students were badly in need of explanation and reassurance and whose faculty felt ignored and humiliated, showed how much distrust and lack of faith in reasoned discourse had developed.

## IX. THE AFTERMATH

Benjamin I. Schwartz

*This document has been written by a member of the Committee of Fifteen who has served on the working group studying the history and causes of the recent crisis. The paper has not, however, been reviewed by the Committee, and is therefore not a Committee Document.*

The bust of April 10, as we are all aware, was to prove a traumatic experience for a large part of our student body and for some sectors of the faculty. Here one must stress not only the speed and style of the police action itself, but also the attitude toward the police which had emerged among students since the events of Chicago. It is quite clear that the immediate cause of the "strike" crisis which was to emerge within the next several days was not the forcible seizure of University Hall but the so-called bust. One might argue that a prolonged occupation of University Hall might have won wide student support but the evidence seems to run counter to such an argument. One might argue more plausibly that even a police action following upon consultation with students, faculty and the deans of several other faculties would have still made police action unacceptable to students. This is by no means certain, but the conditions under which a police action might have taken place would probably have been far less ominous than the conditions under which it actually occurred.

The question which engages one's attention at this point is how the anger against the Administration on the part of so many students engendered by the bust led to a widespread acceptance of a whole series of "demands" directed both to the Administration and the faculty. One might argue that the insistence on the "demands" was simply a means of finding a vent for anger against the Administration as well as for forcing the faculty to declare its solidarity with the students. The fact remains, however, that

at least two of the issues — the issue of ROTC and the concern with restructuring — had, as indicated, been a source of genuine concern before April 9. The atmosphere engendered by the bust created receptivity to the escalation of issues into demands and also created an atmosphere of generalized mistrust within which one could assume that all other charges brought against the Administration were also justified. This does not mean that some did not become genuinely concerned with the issue of expansion after April 10 who were not concerned before. Here, however, the atmosphere of the occasion played a considerable role.

It is to be noted that even during the 9 days of the strike, the strengths of the Harvard community were by no means completely dissipated. Incredible as it may seem, the mammoth meetings in the stadium were conducted according to orderly procedure. The faculty, in spite of inner divisions, maintained an overall unity which suggests that it might have achieved such a unity if consulted in the face of the crisis of April 9. The framework of civility did not collapse. Its further strengthening will, however, demand further effort on the part of all.



## REPORT FROM THE COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN ON DISCIPLINARY DECISIONS

*(Faculty of Arts and Sciences Meeting, June 9, 1969)*

1. The Committee has reached decisions in the cases of 138 students charged with misconduct in connection with the forcible occupation of University Hall on April 9-10, 1969 and related events. Of the 138 students involved, 86 were undergraduates in Harvard College; 32 were Radcliffe undergraduates; and 20 were graduate students. Five additional cases were instituted but were later dropped by the Dean.

In its deliberations, the Committee has remained mindful that the purpose of discipline in a university is to maintain and protect the basic commitment and essential functions of the university, and not to enforce a criminal code. It has also kept in mind the relationship of its disciplinary responsibilities to the two other parts of its triple mission: "to investigate the causes of the present crisis" and "to recommend changes in the governance of the University".

The Committee reminds the Faculty of the procedure followed in these cases, published and distributed to the entire University community originally on April 28 and, in revised form, on May 2, 1969.

In each case, a statement in writing clearly describing the alleged misconduct of the student was served upon him (by the Dean of Harvard College, the Dean of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, or a Dean of Radcliffe College). A copy of the statement was filed with the Committee of Fifteen, together with an acknowledgment or certification of service. The next step was a hearing, for which the student had five days to prepare. The hearing was conducted by a three-man panel, consisting of a faculty member of the Committee of Fifteen, a student member of the Committee, and a faculty member or teaching

fellow of the Harvard Law School. The student in his discretion could bring a lawyer or any other adviser.

The sole function of the hearing was to determine the facts. It culminated in a finding of facts, based exclusively on evidence presented to the hearing panel. A copy of the findings of fact in each case was furnished to the student, who was given five more days in which he could request a rehearing, if he wished to do so. Only after the lapse of this additional five-day period did the Committee give consideration to what discipline might be appropriate in the particular case. The actual decision on discipline in each case was made by the Committee of Fifteen as a whole.

Before taking up particular cases, the Committee gave extensive consideration to various possible theories and modes of discipline and to the relationship of discipline in these cases to the causes of the crisis and to the problems and prospects of university reform. In turning to particular cases, the Committee took account of the facts as found by the hearing panel, and also the student's prior disciplinary record as submitted by the Dean with notice to the student.

2. The cases fall into three main categories. The first comprises students who took part in the forcible occupation of University Hall and, in so doing, physically mishandled members of the University community. The second comprises students who took part in the forcible occupation of University Hall and, in so doing, used force in some manner other than the physical mishandling of members of the University community. The third comprises students who took part in the forcible occupation of University Hall in the sense that they were present in the building during the occupation, despite instruction to leave. Within each category, the Committee took account of the record of prior discipline (if any).

3. Under Paragraph 10 of the procedure promulgated by the Committee of Fifteen: "The complaint, the student's response, the transcript of record, and all other papers in the proceeding except the final disposition of the case shall be for use only in the proceeding and in the internal processes of the University related thereto; and no such transcript, record or paper shall be voluntarily disclosed to any person outside the University except

with the student's consent." As the Faculty will recognize, this provision, designed for the protection of the students involved, imposes requirements of special care upon the Committee of Fifteen in reporting its decision.

4. In consequence, the Committee could not justifiably incorporate the names of the students and the data in their cases in this document, intended for distribution to all members of the Faculty. This document is designed as a summary of the background, frame of reference, and steps taken and consideration given in each case. In the oral presentation to the Faculty, the Committee will have available the file in each decided case, and will stand ready to report the contents in such detail as the Faculty may wish.

5. In 3 cases falling in the first category, the Committee recommends dismissal of the student. These recommendations will take effect if approved by a vote of at least two-thirds of the members of the Faculty present and voting.

6. In 5 additional cases falling in the first category, the Committee entered decisions of "separation" for a period of one or two years. "Separation" is a new form of discipline designed by the Committee. It requires the student to leave the University for a stated period, and conditions his possible return at the end of the period on (a) a determination by a committee or agency then discharging the responsibilities now vested in the Committee of Fifteen that the student is ready to take his place as a member of the University community, and (b) approval by a majority vote of the Faculty.

7. In 4 additional cases falling in the second category, and in 4 cases falling in the third category with a record of prior discipline to which the Committee considered it necessary to give appropriate weight, the Committee entered decisions requiring the student to withdraw from the University for a period of one year or one term, and conditioning his possible readmittance at the end of the period on a determination by a committee or agency then exercising the responsibilities now vested in the Committee of Fifteen that he is ready to take his place as a member of the University community.

8. In 20 additional cases, the Committee entered decisions requiring the student to withdraw from the University for a

period no less than one year, but suspended the requirement with notice to the student that the suspension would be nullified and the requirement to withdraw made effective in the event of subsequent misconduct deemed by the Committee of Fifteen (or a designated successor) sufficiently serious to warrant such a consequence. In each such case, the student is permitted to remain in the University and to take part in extracurricular activities; and his status in regard to financial aid (if any) is not affected. At the end of one year, a committee or agency then exercising the responsibilities now vested in the Committee of Fifteen will determine whether the requirement to withdraw shall be terminated, thus removing the student from disciplinary status. These cases all fall in the third category, with a record of prior discipline in each case to which the Committee considered it necessary to give appropriate weight.

9. In 102 additional cases falling in the third category without a record of prior discipline, the Committee reached decisions to place the student under warning. "Placing under warning" is a new form of discipline, designed by the Committee in the belief that probation is neither appropriate nor effective in cases of this kind. In placing a student under warning, the Committee deplores his conduct as detrimental to the basic commitment and essential functions of a university. He is permitted to remain in the University and to take part in extracurricular activities; and his status in regard to financial aid (if any) is not affected. The Committee warns him, however, that in the event of any subsequent misconduct, his disciplinary status will be the more grave because of his participation in the forcible occupation of University Hall on April 9-10, 1969.

10. In notifying each student of the result in his case, the Committee has made a special effort to explain both the meaning and the basis of its decision. It has supplemented its letter covering his specific case with a broader and more comprehensive letter, a copy of which is attached. It has also explained that, under the Committee's rules of procedure, the student within three days may still request reconsideration by the Committee; and that as a part of its reconsideration, the Committee will be glad to talk with any senior tutor or other officer of the University designated by the student.

ATTACHMENT TO COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN  
REPORT ON DISCIPLINARY DECISIONS

June 4, 1969

Dear -----:

The Committee of Fifteen is fully aware of the diversity of motives that led students to participate in the forcible occupation of University Hall. Many had not approved of the decision to occupy the building or joined in any planning of the seizure. Some entered University Hall, and remained there, out of a desire to bear witness against evils or injustices which pervade our society or state policies. Some were unhappy about acts or statements of members of the University administration or governing boards, or impatient with what they regard as the slowness or bias of procedures for the redress of grievances. Some felt a deep urge to assert their solidarity with those who had taken a grave and perilous step and to establish a community in the midst of what many students deem a cold and impersonal University. Such motives were, on the whole, honorable and sometimes noble. However, the act itself — joining in the forcible occupation of University Hall — must be severely judged. Those who joined a given group because they share some of its purposes cannot absolve themselves of all responsibility for the actions and tactics of the group.

One may sympathize with the motives of many of the occupiers, or share their views about the University or about American society. But there are more constructive ways of pursuing goals. The University had responded, however imperfectly or tortuously, to student concerns and initiatives in the months that preceded these events. If many felt that the response was inadequate, there were peaceful ways of convincing others of the rightness of one's cause, or of the need to transform Harvard's relations with the world at large, or Harvard's procedures of decision. The best way is to put forth intelligent proposals, to



use existing mechanisms in order to persuade others, to suggest and promote new mechanisms, to mobilize support behind such proposals – in other words, to make use of all the opportunities provided by the University without violating its basic commitment to reasoned discourse. The previous argument would not be valid had this University been a totally coercive institution. But whatever Harvard's flaws and failures, about which this committee intends to speak clearly and firmly, there were other ways of dealing with them than the forcible occupation of University Hall.

As for those whose target was society, an evil and unjustifiable war, and the University's supposed connections with social injustice, they often argue that students who feel impotent both as citizens and as a minority with limited rights and powers can make their influence felt only in the University. But the fact remains that striking at the University is likely to produce not a better society but one more repressive and not at all more enlightened. Whatever else may be said of Harvard, its intellectual life serves to generate criticisms of society and, to a considerable degree, to provide catalysts of constructive social change.

Even if one believes that the ends justified the means, those who today assert that the seizure produced worthwhile results must realize that the costs themselves were too high. These results, insofar as they are due to force, derive at least as much from the shock of the bust as from that of the seizure. In the wake of these shocks, what put the place together again and made it move forward was a generalized and passionate display of the good uses of reason: colloquia, meetings, discussions, negotiations, most of which proved constructive and orderly. Surely the price paid by the University – animosities, divisions, sanctions, fatigue, the genuine suffering inflicted by the events on so many, and the diversion of energy from the essential functions of the University – proves that disruptive tactics cannot become a recurrent method of government or progress. Surely, the members of this community and especially the students have enough imagination to produce the benefits without the costs. Confrontation, violent action and reaction, the radicalization of some and the alienation of others are not constructive in themselves.

Finally, some of the means were bad in themselves. An academic community must be committed to the use of reason and the avoidance of violence. To be sure, there was more violence during the bust than in the seizure; this Committee has no intention of endorsing this bust and addresses itself to this matter in a separate document. But had there been no forcible seizure of the building, there would not have arisen any reason to call the police; had this seizure not been accompanied by intolerable acts of force and violence, the idea that an early call was necessary would not have arisen in the minds of some. The resort to the police, while it may have momentarily erased in the minds of many the responsibility of those who had seized the building, does not in fact excuse them.

Violence is simply not compatible with the serious and sustained intellectual work which is the essence of a University. The very intellectual processes on which study, teaching and research depend cannot proceed in the atmosphere of destructive emotions which invariably accompany violence and which are too often unleashed by it. If the University is to make any contribution toward reducing or overcoming the violence that prevails in the world it must itself remain an oasis of non-violence. This does not mean that even the subtle forms of repression and authoritarianism which any hierarchical (or for that matter "participatory") organization creates must be accepted; it means that they must be fought in ways that are not self-defeating.

Of course, many will argue that their presence in the building was entirely peaceful, and that the only violence was that which occurred at their expense at 5:00 a.m. But those who joined in what had begun as a violent take-over and who asserted through their presence their solidarity with the small group that had seized the building (a group many members of which broke that solidarity by seeing to it that they, at least, would be out before the police came in) made themselves willy nilly the pawns of that group. The non-violent ones thus placed themselves at the mercy of the more violent ones and aligned themselves with the most intransigent. Those who came in to protest against the lack of dialogue in the University abetted those who refused any dialogue at all. Those who came in with the hope of improving the University, served those who wanted to shut it down. Those

who came to protest against Vietnam, the very symbol of violence, became the hostages of those who favor violence as the method of change.

For there were at least two symbolic dimensions to the affair of University Hall. One may have been Vietnam, which is what many students saw. But another was the breakdown of the rule of non-violence, without which no University can survive. The fact that this rule was broken on both sides certainly cannot excuse those who broke it first. Many students who participated in the seizure may not have seen in it anything but a sit-in, or an act of militant nonviolence or civil disobedience. But there is a difference between a sit-in — an unauthorized presence in a building — and a forcible seizure of a building accompanied by a lock-out. And there are differences between the acts of a Gandhi or a Martin Luther King and the events of April 9. The former condoned no acts of violence — indeed Gandhi interrupted many of the protests he led as soon as acts of violence had occurred. Moreover, Gandhi and Dr. King fully accepted the disciplinary implications of their acts: they acted in order to change rules they deemed unjust, but they fully expected to pay a price — because they knew that, whereas one must appeal against unjust rules, there can be *no* society without rules.

It is not the intention of this Committee to blame only one group for recent events, or to pretend that there is some group that made no mistakes. Our purpose is to reunite the University community or, as some may say, to help Harvard become a genuine community. You are a member of it. We expect you to participate actively in the colossal task of reexamination which will affect the curriculum as well as the structure of the University; but you must understand that no valid reforms can be made without adequate procedures for discussion and persuasion. We expect the role of students in the University to grow; you must understand, however, that rights must be accompanied by obligations. Only if the University can establish its own code of behavior, and apply it, will it be able to prevent others, be they the Federal government or the local police, from imposing their code on us. The disciplinary decisions of this Committee are only part of an overall effect which includes an assessment

of the causes of recent events, the establishment of a code of behavior, and planning for reconstruction.

If you find our disciplinary decisions unjust, you should remember these words of Albert Camus: "If it is true that in history . . . values do not survive unless they have been fought for, the fight is not enough to justify them. The fight itself must be justified and enlightened by those values. When fighting for your truth, you must be careful not to kill it with the very weapons you are using to defend it . . . Knowing that, the intellectual has the role of distinguishing in each camp the respective limits of force and justice . . . in order to disintoxicate minds and to calm fanaticism." What Camus said of the intellectual applies to all members of this community.

By Direction of the Committee of Fifteen

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Administrative Assistant

## RESOLUTION ON RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES: INTERIM STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES

*(Adopted by the Faculty of Arts and Sciences at its meeting of June 9, 1969, by a vote of 365 to 21.)*

The central functions of an academic community are learning, teaching, research and scholarship. They must be characterized by reasoned discourse, intellectual honesty, mutual respect, and openness to constructive change. By accepting membership in this community, an individual neither surrenders his rights nor escapes his fundamental responsibilities as a citizen, but acquires additional rights as well as responsibilities to the whole University community. They do not require him to be silent and passive. But they do require him to see how easily an academic community can be violated, knowingly or unknowingly — whether by actual violence or by lack of responsiveness to widely perceived needs for change; whether by impatience or by insensitivity; or by failure in a process of decision to make sufficient effort to consult those who have to live with the results of the decision.

We believe it timely to state explicitly what certain of these rights and responsibilities are, and to establish procedures for their protection and enforcement. The present formulation is an interim statement, limited to activities that touch on the essential functions of a university. We recognize the need to formulate, in the near future, a document that will emerge from the widest discussion within and will reflect a wide consensus of all members of the Harvard community. This statement shall apply equally to students, to officers of instruction, and to officers of administration.

All individuals or groups within the University community have the right to express, advocate and publicize their opinions.



They also have the right to press by appropriate means for action on any matter on which they believe that the University can and should act, and they have the right to be given a full and fair hearing and prompt response. To be appropriate the means must respect both the need to preserve the essential commitment of the University and the right of individual or collective expression of opinion or dissent. We have taken and will continue to take measures aimed both at dealing with issues and grievances raised by members of the community and at improving and broadening the procedures by which such matters can be resolved and decisions made. We welcome participation of all members of the community in this endeavor.

We regard the following activities as unacceptable because they would prevent or impede the performance of the essential tasks of the University and are incompatible with the shared purposes of an academic community:

- a. violence against any member or guest of the University community;
- b. deliberate interference with academic freedom and freedom of speech (including not only disruption of a class but also interference with the freedom of any speaker invited by any section of the University community to express his views);
- c. theft or willful destruction of University property or of the property of members of the University;
- d. forcible interference with the freedom of movement of any member or guest of the University;
- e. obstruction of the normal processes and activities essential to the functions of the University community.

Any such activity shall subject the violator to discipline by an appropriate agent.

In case of any violation of any of the subparagraphs *a* through *e* by a student, he shall be subject to appropriate discipline within the full range of possible disciplinary measures by the Faculty or by a committee or agent to which the Faculty may have delegated disciplinary power. Appropriate discipline for a student who violates subparagraph *a* will ordinarily be expulsion, dismissal, separation, or requirement to withdraw. In cases of violations of subparagraphs *c*, *d*, and *e*, discipline will ordinarily

be initiated upon complaint by a member of the University community adversely affected, or on a determination of probable cause by a committee or agent to which the Faculty may have delegated disciplinary power.

In cases of violation of any of the subparagraphs *a* through *e*, a student found to be engaging in unacceptable activities may be warned to stop. If, despite the warning, the student persists in the unacceptable activity, he may be suspended summarily from the University by a committee or agent to which the Faculty may have delegated disciplinary power, pending completion of a regular disciplinary proceeding.

Occasions may arise that may require the appropriate University authorities to use other proper means to control or terminate unacceptable activities. It is the sense of the Faculty that the appropriate authorities should attempt whenever possible to deal with such occasions through the disciplinary measures described in the preceding paragraphs. The Faculty also urges that appropriate University authorities consult with representative student and faculty bodies to the maximum extent practicable in devising and implementing ways to invoke other proper means of control.

While this Interim Statement is in effect, the disciplinary authority over students engaging in the activities listed above shall be delegated to the Committee of Fifteen or a designated successor. The power of summary suspension shall be delegated jointly to the Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences and the Committee of Fifteen (or its designated successor), who are authorized to establish appropriate working arrangements to give effect to this power.

We further affirm that an officer of instruction or administration who engages in the unacceptable activities listed above should also be considered subject to discipline by the appropriate agencies of the University.

**RESOLVED:**

That the Faculty of Arts and Sciences approves the Interim Statement of Rights and Responsibilities for the College and the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences.

## PLANS OF WORKING GROUP THREE

Working Group Three was established to coordinate the efforts of the Committee of Fifteen pertaining to its third charge: "to consult with representatives of the other Faculties and with student representatives in order to recommend changes in the governance of the University." This is clearly the most far-ranging assignment of the Committee, and will require many months for its satisfactory completion. The active cooperation and participation of students, officers of instruction, and officers of administration in all parts of the University, as well as that of alumni and the Governing Boards, is essential and will continue to be most earnestly solicited.

In considering the governance of the University, we shall be profoundly influenced by issues raised during our investigation of the recent crisis. In our work under all three charges to this Committee, our primary purpose is the strengthening of that academic community which is the very essence of Harvard University. To this end we wish simply to report at this time certain plans and preliminary observations on the subject of governance.

Although some measure of inequality is inherent in any hierarchical structure, inequity is detrimental to the responsive and responsible administration required by any academic community. All those having responsibility for making major decisions should make a reasonable attempt at wide consultation of those affected whenever appropriate. Depending on the questions involved, members of the community may become involved in decision making by participation therein, by consultation on a regular basis, by access through petition, or simply by informing themselves and others on the issues concerned.

It is the intention of the Committee to engage in extensive consultation and discussion within the Harvard community to discover the modes of governance now employed, to discern the strengths and weaknesses of the current procedures, and to

devise and evaluate alternatives. In the latter connection, we propose to consider the structure and experience of other major universities. Given the scope of the investigations which the Committee proposes to undertake, we expect that its activities with respect to this charge will continue throughout the next academic year. We have been fortunate in engaging Mr. Daniel Steiner (Harvard, A.B. 1954, LL.B. 1958) as Administrative Assistant to the Committee. He will devote full time to the work of the Committee on the problems of restructuring for a period of ten months from September 1, 1969.

The work of this Committee will inevitably impinge upon that of other groups within the University. It is our aim to cooperate with all such groups, to help wherever possible to facilitate their cooperation with one another, and where appropriate to serve as a focus for coordinating proposals emanating from various quarters.

We recognize the close relation of our assignment to that of the Committee of the Overseers headed by Judge Henry Friendly. We have already met jointly with them on one occasion. The two Committees will pursue their inquiries separately, but will endeavor to minimize duplication in their information gathering activities.

We have also consulted with and intend to coordinate our efforts with those of the committee headed by Professor Merle Fainsod which has been concerned for several months with the internal operations of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences. Their assignment necessarily overlaps with a portion of ours, and we shall of course take careful account of their findings and of any Faculty action on their recommendations.

The Faculty of Arts and Sciences, though central, is but one of the several Faculties of the University. It seems essential that the various Faculties join in considering the establishment, perhaps through a version of the existing University Council, of a deliberative and decision-making body representing the whole University, through which common concerns of all members of the community can be expressed. We therefore urge other Faculties to establish groups empowered to consider such matters and to engage in discussion with us.

As we indicated in a statement released May 13, 1969, there are many areas which the Committee intends to explore. Some of these, for example, together with questions we have posed, are the following.

1. What is and what should be the relationship between the Faculty of Arts and Sciences and the Governing Boards? What is and what should be the role of the Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences — to represent the Faculty of the Governing Boards or *vice versa*?

2. What changes might be made in the size, character of membership, method of election (including changes in the voting constituency), and responsibilities of the Governing Boards? How might these bodies be made more accessible to faculty and student opinion?

3. What is and what should be the relationship of the President of Harvard to: a) the internal Harvard community, b) the alumni, c) the larger public?

In addition to such specific questions concerning governance the Committee realizes that there are many problems facing the community and currently being studied by others that have structural aspects which we must consider. In these areas mutually supporting efforts by many groups are required. It is not for this Committee to play a major role in these areas except insofar as related questions arise naturally in the course of our investigations of the governance of the University. For instance, problems attendant on the proposed merger or integration of Harvard and Radcliffe will necessarily be involved in our discussions. Structural changes may be in order to facilitate improvements of intellectual and educational aspects of Harvard. The function of the Houses within the life of the University may be related to attempts to bring decision making as close as possible to those immediately concerned. Further instances will no doubt emerge as our deliberations proceed.

We have already sent letters of inquiry to all present and past Department Chairmen in this Faculty and to all Masters and Senior Tutors, containing detailed sets of questions intended to initiate discussion on matters related to aspects of the operation of Departments and Houses respectively. We are arranging an extensive series of interviews with officers of administration and



instruction and with members of the Governing Boards beginning immediately after Commencement. These will continue into the Fall term and will be expanded to include similar meetings with concerned students and with members of this and other Faculties. We anticipate extended discussion, both public and private, of specific issues during the Fall term, and will report from time to time to the Faculty.

Early in the Fall term, we intend to make recommendations concerning the relationship between discipline and financial aid, and concerning the designation of a successor body bearing disciplinary powers comparable to those now vested in the Committee of Fifteen. We will establish procedures for the formulation and ratification of a resolution on rights and responsibilities that will emerge from the widest discussion within and will reflect a wide consensus of all members of the Harvard community. The Committee will work through the summer on these and other aspects of its charge.

forcement of these rights and responsibilities. These procedures include a provision for temporary suspension of a student who, having been warned to stop, persists in activities defined as unacceptable under the Resolution.

The Resolution on Rights and Responsibilities was adopted by the Faculty, at its meeting of June 9, by a vote of 365 to 21. Early in the Fall term the Committee of Fifteen will propose a revised draft statement on rights and responsibilities as well as procedures for the formulation and ratification of a resolution that will emerge from the widest discussion within and will reflect a wide consensus of all members of the Harvard community. At the first Faculty meeting in the Fall the Committee will recommend successor bodies which will exercise the power of temporary suspension and hold disciplinary jurisdiction in the case of students and officers charged with engaging in activities defined as unacceptable in the Resolution on Rights and Responsibilities.

The final document, "Plans of Working Group Three" (page 73), reports the planning and preliminary observations of the sub-group of the Committee of Fifteen specifically investigating possible changes in the governance of the University. The report lists several areas the Committee continues to explore, along with questions which it hopes to see addressed by all interested members of the Harvard community. Hearings with officers of instruction and administration are being held throughout the summer; they will continue into the Fall term and will be expanded to include similar meetings with students. We also anticipate extended discussion, in public meetings and symposia as well as in interviews, through the Fall term. The Committee, which expects its work during 1969-70 to be devoted almost exclusively to developing recommendations concerning the governance of the University, will report periodically to the Faculty and to the Harvard community generally. Its final recommendations should be ready for presentation late in the Spring term, 1970.

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In working toward recommendations concerning changes in governance, the Committee seeks all proposals, particular as well as general, as to possible changes in any of the operations or activities of any element of the University. During the year 1969-1970 the Committee of Fifteen will continue to serve as a body to receive suggestions or complaints from students and officers relating to matters other than cases of discipline. (Procedures in cases of discipline are set forth in the Resolution on Rights and Responsibilities.) The Committee will thus continue to provide a forum for informal discussion and a means to channel problems and issues to appropriate faculty committees or officers with such suggestions or comments as may be appropriate. Experience has shown that considering such suggestions and complaints can make a significant contribution to the work of the Committee related to its assignment concerned with changes in governance.

MEMBERS OF THE  
COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN

DONALD G. ANDERSON <i>(Applied Mathematics)</i>	STANLEY HOFFMANN <i>(Government)</i>
ROBERT H. BLUMENTHAL <i>(Harvard '69)</i>	GERALD HOLTON <i>(Physics)</i>
RENÉE CHOTINER <i>(Radcliffe '70)</i>	MILTON KATZ <i>(Law)</i>
JOHN T. DUNLOP <i>(Economics)</i>	KEITH B. MACADAM <i>(G.S.A.S.)</i>
JOHN T. EDSALL <i>(Biological Chemistry)</i>	JOHN C. READ <i>(Harvard '69)</i>
JOHN P. FERNANDEZ <i>(Harvard '69)</i>	ROGER ROSENBLATT <i>(English)</i>
ALAN HEIMERT <i>(English)</i>	BENJAMIN I. SCHWARTZ <i>(History and Government)</i>
	JAMES Q. WILSON <i>(Government)</i>